Theoretical and Computational Basis for Economical Ressource Allocation in Application Layer Networks -Annual Report Year 1 by Eymann, Torsten et al.
Bayreuther Arbeitspapiere zur Wirtschaftsinformatik
Lehrstuhl für
Wirtschaftsinformatik
Information Systems
Management
Bayreuth Reports on Information Systems Management
No. 7
2005
Björn Schnizler / Dirk Neumann / Daniel Veit / Michael Reinicke / Werner Streitberger / Torsten 
Eymann / Felix Freitag / Isaac Chao / Pablo Chacin
Theoretical and Computational Basis for CATNETS - 
Annual Report Year 1
ISSN 1864-9300 
Die Arbeitspapiere des Lehrstuhls für 
Wirtschaftsinformatik dienen der Darstellung 
vorläufiger Ergebnisse, die i. d. R. noch für 
spätere Veröffentlichungen überarbeitet werden. 
Die Autoren sind deshalb für kritische Hinweise 
dankbar.
 The Bayreuth Reports on Information Systems 
Management comprise preliminary results 
which will usually be revised for subsequent 
publications. Critical comments would be 
appreciated by the authors. 
Alle Rechte vorbehalten. Insbesondere die der 
Übersetzung, des Nachdruckes, des Vortrags, 
der Entnahme von Abbildungen und Tabellen – 
auch bei nur auszugsweiser Verwertung. 
 All rights reserved. No part of this report may 
be reproduced by any means, or translated. 
Authors: Information Systems and Management 
Working Paper Series 
Edited by: 
Prof. Dr. Torsten Eymann 
Managing Assistant and Contact: 
Raimund Matros 
Universität Bayreuth 
Lehrstuhl für Wirtschaftsinformatik (BWL VII) 
Prof. Dr. Torsten Eymann 
Universitätsstrasse 30 
95447 Bayreuth 
Germany 
Email: raimund.matros@uni-bayreuth.de ISSN
Björn Schnizler, Dirk Neumann, Daniel Veit 
(University of Karlsruhe), Michael Reinicke, 
Werner Streitberger,Torsten Eymann (University 
of Bayreuth), Felix Freitag, Isaac Chao, Pablo 
Chacin (Universidad Politecnica de Catalunya)
1864-9300 
IST-FP6-003769 CATNETS
D1.1
WP 1: Theoretical and Computational Basis
Contractual Date of Delivery to the CEC: 31. August 2005
Actual Date of Delivery to the CEC: 23. September 2005
Author(s): Bjo¨rn Schnizler, Dirk Neumann, Daniel Veit (University of Karlsruhe)
Michael Reinicke, Werner Streitberger, Torsten Eymann (University of Bayreuth)
Felix Freitag, Isaac Chao, Pablo Chacin (Universitat Politecnica de Catalunya)
Workpackage: WP 1 Theoretical and Computational Basis
Est. person months: 25
Security: public
Nature: submitted version
Version: 1.4
Total number of pages: 116
Abstract:
The main content of this deliverable is the identification and definition of market mechanisms
for Application Layer Networks (ALNs). On basis of the structured Market Engineering
process, the work comprises the identification of requirements which adequate market
mechanisms for ALNs have to fulfill. Subsequently, two mechanisms for each, the centralized
and the decentralized case are described in this document. These build the theoretical foundation
for the work within the following two years of the CATNETS project.
Keywords (optional):
Decentralized Market Mechanisms, Centralized Market Mechanisms, Catallaxy, Market
Engineering
CATNETS Consortium
This document is part of a research project partially funded by the IST Programme of the Commission of the Eu-
ropean Communities as project number IST-FP6-003769. The partners in this project are: LS Wirtschaftsinformatik
(BWL VII) / University of Bayreuth (coordinator, Germany), Arquitectura de Computadors / Universitat Politecnica
de Catalunya (Spain), Information Management and Systems / University of Karlsruhe (TH) (Germany), Dipartimento
di Economia / Universit delle merche Ancona (Italy), School of Computer Science and the Welsh eScience Centre /
University of Cardiff (United Kingdom), Automated Reasoning Systems Division / ITC-irst Trento (Italy).
University of Bayreuth
LS Wirtschaftsinformatik (BWL VII)
95440 Bayreuth
Germany
Tel: +49 921 55-2807, Fax: +49 921 55-2816
Contactperson: Torsten Eymann
E-mail: catnets@uni-bayreuth.de
Universitat Politecnica de Catalunya
Arquitectura de Computadors
Jordi Girona, 1-3
08034 Barcelona
Spain
Tel: +34 93 4016882, Fax: +34 93 4017055
Contactperson: Felix Freitag
E-mail: felix@ac.upc.es
University of Karlsruhe
Institute for Information Management and Systems
Englerstr. 14
76131 Karlsruhe
Germany
Tel: +49 721 608 8370, Fax: +49 721 608 8399
Contactperson: Daniel Veit
E-mail: veit@iw.uka.de
Universit delle merche Ancona
Dipartimento di Economia
Piazzale Martelli 8
60121 Ancona
Italy
Tel: 39-071- 220.7088 , Fax: +39-071- 220.7102
Contactperson: Mauro Gallegati
E-mail: gallegati@dea.unian.it
University of Cardiff
School of Computer Science and the Welsh eScience Centre
University of Caradiff, Wales
Cardiff CF24 3AA, UK
United Kingdom
Tel: +44 (0)2920 875542, Fax: +44 (0)2920 874598
Contactperson: Omer F. Rana
E-mail: o.f.rana@cs.cardiff.ac.uk
ITC-irst Trento
Automated Reasoning Systems Division
Via Sommarive, 18
38050 Povo - Trento
Italy
Tel: +39 0461 314 314, Fax: +39 0461 302 040
Contactperson: Floriano Zini
E-mail: zini@itc.it
Changes
Version Date Author Changes
1.0 10.8.05 bsc initial
1.1 9.9.05 ws description of the decentralized market
1.2 16.9.05 ws chapter 5 added, minor corrections
1.3 19.9.05 ws state of the art section added
1.4 19.9.05 bsc minor corrections on base of general feedback
Contents
1 Introduction 3
1.1 Motivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.2 CATNETS Scenario . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
1.3 State of the art: Market-based Resource Management Systems . . . . . . 7
1.4 Objective of WP1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2 Market Engineering 14
2.1 Phase 1: Environmental Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
2.1.1 Environment Definition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
2.1.2 Requirement Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
2.2 Phase 2: Design and Implementation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
2.2.1 Conceptual Design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
2.2.2 Embodiment Design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
2.2.3 Detail Design and Implementation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
2.3 Phase 3: Testing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
2.4 Phase 4: Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
3 Specifications of the Service Market 22
3.1 Environmental Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
3.1.1 Environment Definition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
3.1.2 Requirement Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
3.2 Meeting the Requirements – Related Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
3.2.1 Centralized Mechanisms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
3.2.2 Decentralized Mechanisms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
3.2.3 Summary of Related Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
3.3 Design of the Service Market . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
3.3.1 Bidding Language and Message Specification . . . . . . . . . . . 35
3.3.2 Centralized Market . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
3.3.3 Decentralized Market . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
3.4 Relations to other Work Packages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
3.4.1 Relations to Simulator (WP2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
3.4.2 Relations to Proof of Concept (WP3) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
3.4.3 Relations to Evaluation (WP4) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
1
CONTENTS 2
4 Specifications of the Resource Market 63
4.1 Environmental Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
4.1.1 Environment Definition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
4.1.2 Requirement Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
4.2 Meeting the Requirements – Related Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
4.2.1 Centralized Mechanisms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
4.2.2 Decentralized Mechanisms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
4.2.3 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
4.3 Design of the Resource Market . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
4.3.1 Bidding Language and Message Specification . . . . . . . . . . . 72
4.3.2 Centralized Market . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
4.3.3 Decentralized Market . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
4.4 Relations to other Work Packages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
4.4.1 Relation to Simulator (WP2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
4.4.2 Relation to Proof of Concept (WP3) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
4.4.3 Relation to Evaluation (WP4) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
5 Mappable Applications 91
5.1 BitTorrent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
5.2 PlanetLab . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
5.3 Coral . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
6 Conclusion 97
6.1 Review of this Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
6.2 Outlook on Next Steps . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
Bibliography 98
Chapter 1
Introduction
What makes economics so attractive for computing environments is that its central re-
search question lies in the efficient allocation of resources, provided by suppliers and in
demand by customers. In computing environments like Grid Computing, the resources
in question are processor time or storage space, while economic actors are represented
by software agents or web services [BAG01]. It appears that, by just implementing mar-
kets in computing environments, the satisfying ability of economics might be viable for
creating cost-effective computer architectures. However, between the mostly descriptive
economic concept and the normative technical implementation lies a fundamental gap,
requiring selective choice of how actors, resources, goods, and markets are modeled and
embedded into a technical environment.
There are several competing descriptive approaches to how economic resource allo-
cation mechanisms work. In general, Economics is essentially all about the coordina-
tion of systems consisting of utility-maximizing agents, who satisfy their needs using
some mechanism for solving a distributed resource allocation problem. The effect of
this mechanism is a state where prices are set, so that supply and demand is perfectly
balanced, and the number of transactions is maximized [KSBE00]. All implementation
attempts try either to recreate the mechanism, or to achieve the effect by using another
mechanism, adding some side condition like zero communication costs or a steady envi-
ronment state. Adam Smith’s proverbial invisible hand [Smi79] was a first concept of a
decentralized mechanism without a coordinator, but Smith gave no implementation of that
mechanism. A century later, Leon Walras [Wal54] introduced a central auctioneer, who
iteratively solved the allocation problem out of total knowledge of supply and demand.
With this mechanism, Walras was able to generate the desired equilibrium effect. Most of
today’s economic research relies on Walras’ tatonnement process as a valid picture of the
mechanism, which influences also the possible realization in computing environments.
An example is the realization by Wellman [Wel93], titled Market-Oriented Programming
(MOP), in an distributed artificial intelligence (DAI) environment. Wellman takes the no-
tion that ”an economy is a multi agent system” literally; the distributed agents individually
3
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compute their utility functions and post that information to a centralized Walrasian auc-
tioneer. During the computation process, interrelated markets are successively brought to
near-equilibrium by the auctioneer, with the final general equilibrium effect as the ”gold
standard” to achieve. MOP has been successfully used in electricity markets [Ygg98],
for multi-commodity flow problems [Wel93], supply chain management [WW03] or for
negotiations about the quality of service in multimedia networks [YUWI95].
In contrast, Economics research on self-organization still aims at explaining the mech-
anism of the invisible hand, e.g. Agent-based Computational Economics [Tes02]. Ac-
tually, there is growing interest in using self-organization, as indicated by the start of
large industrial research concepts like IBM’s Autonomic Computing initiative. Auto-
nomic Computing uses a biological paradigm as a design and control metaphor, the au-
tonomic nervous system [KC03]. If the mechanisms underlying Hayek’s spontaneous
order concept [HBKC89] can be properly understood, it might be possible to build large
Autonomic information systems using the Catallaxy approach, where artificial entities co-
ordinate themselves, just as human economy participants do in the real world. For a start,
we have to discuss whether the desired effects of Autonomic Computing are achievable
(and describable) using economic terms.
IBM’s Autonomic Computing Manifesto (IBM) describes seven characteristics, which
self-adapting systems should exhibit. The core characteristics are contained in the so-
called CHOP cycle of self-configuring, self-healing, self-optimizing and self-protection
capabilities. The self-configuration property is indicated in the variation of prices when
adding or removing service providers (cf. the different density regimes). The self-healing
of the system is apparent in case a service provider instance shuts down or a network
connection gets broken (cf. the different dynamics regimes). The application is self-
optimizing, in that the agents constantly attempt to change their strategies towards the
maximum utility-eliciting negotiation positions, which respectively lay on the total sup-
ply and demand curves. The self-protection of the application finally can be reached by
including security mechanisms like reputation tracking [EPS00]), which are effective in
separating malicious and under performing agents. In addition, viewing Autonomic Com-
puting systems as Economic systems has some merits, too. The main applications for AC
systems will be deeply rooted in a business context. With a biological background, you
need to find biological translations for conceptual data structures and functionality for
describing success, utility, or business goals. This is not a trivial process, and may lead to
semantic loss underway.
For example, the business goal of maintaining availability (to prevent loss of profit
in the case of server downtime), may be translated biologically as ”staying alive”. How-
ever, the semantics of both differ – deliberately shutting down a biological AC system
may qualify for murder, while in economic terms, shutting down a system means buy-
ing it out of business – with the programmer defining what the currency is. The key to
this semantic shift is to view the ”market” as an emergent mechanism of coordinating
and matching supply and demand offers, and market participants as rationally-bounded,
self-interested individuals, like in Neo-Austrian [EPS00] or Neo-Institutional Economics
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[NC90][FR98]. As we move on to technology, which allows us to map unstructured se-
mantic knowledge in large and very dynamic systems, we have to look for decentralized
self-organization, not at least for reasons of exponentially increasing ”costs of ownership”
[TRB99]. Given a highly complex and dynamic ALN infrastructure, scalability and the
management of a great number of heterogeneous resources are supposed to be challenging
issues of future ALNs and computing systems in general. Ubiquitous computing [Wei91]
envisions trillions of computing devices connecting and interacting with each other; Grid
Computing [SP03]) envisions millions of networked processors. To handle the complex-
ity and scale of such systems, the necessity of a centralized management could easily
turn the vision into a ”nightmare” [KC03]. The solution is not necessarily a question of
overcoming semantic gaps or problems of multi-attribute optimization. Discovering and
selecting web services from huge numbers of unreliable candidates alone is challenging
enough.
1.1 Motivation
The increasing interconnection between computers through the Internet has emerged the
vision of Application Layer Networks (ALN). Application Layer Networks comprise an
abstract view on overlay networks (e.g. Peer-to-Peer networks, Grid infrastructures) on
top of the TCP/IP protocol. Their common characteristic is the redundant, distributed
provisioning and access of data, computation or application services, while hiding the
heterogeneity of the service network from the user’s view [ERA 03].
Promising examples for Application Layer Networks are Computational Grids. In the
Computational Grid, computer resources such as processors or hard disks can be accessed
in analogy to the power grid in a plug-and-play environment. A user has access to a reli-
able virtual computer, which consists of many heterogeneous computer resources. These
resources are not visible to the user - such as a consumer of electric power is unaware of
how the demanded electricity is being generated and thereafter transmitted to the power
socket.
At the moment, most of the research done in the area of Application Layer Networks
focuses in particular on the hardware and software infrastructure, such that from a tech-
nical point of view, ”the access to resources is dependable, consistent, pervasive, and
inexpensive” [FK04]. Nonetheless, there are still barriers preventing the deployment of
large-scaled Peer-to-Peer networks or Computational Grids.
One of the key issues in building such networks is to determine which computer
resources are allocated to which service. Most existing approaches such as Legion
[COBW00], Condor [FTF 01], or Gnutella [FFRS02, KSTT04] employ optimization
algorithms, which allocate resources based on static system specific cost functions
[BAGS02, BAV04].
However, static system specific cost functions typically lead to economically ineffi-
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cient allocations [BAGS02, BAV04]. These functions do not guarantee that those de-
manding users will receive their supplied resources who value them highest. Furthermore,
these functions ignore the fact that users owning resources only have incentives offering
resources, if they are adequately compensated. Compensation requires determining how
the supplied resources are allocated among potential buyers and how the prices for the
resources are set. However, for implementing economically efficient Application Layer
Networks both described aspects are crucial.
Recently, the application of market mechanisms for allocating services and resources
in Application Layer Networks has been increasingly suggested [BAGS02, WPBB01a].
According to Hurwicz, markets can be an efficient institution to allocate resources
(Pareto-) optimal [Hur72]. This is achieved by the interplay of demand and supply and
due to the information feedback inherent to the price system. As such, the application
of market mechanisms to Application Layer Networks as an allocation and scheduling
mechanism is deemed promising.
1.2 CATNETS Scenario
In Application Layer Networks, participants offer and request application services and
computing resources of different complexity and value - creating interdependent markets.
In CATNETS, these complex interdependencies are broken down into two types of inter-
related markets:
• (1) a resource market - which involves trading of computational and data resources,
such as processors, memory, etc, and
• (2) a service market - which involves trading of application services.
This distinction between resource and service is necessary to allow different instances
of the same service to be hosted on different resources. It also enables a given service to
be priced based on the particular resource capabilities that are being made available by
some hosting environment.
The scenario that is envisioned in CATNETS is, that there is a set of basic services (e.g.
services to create a PDF or to convert a MP3 file), a set of complex services demanding
these services for a specific job (e.g. an application wants to create a PDF file), and a set of
resource services capable providing computational resources for executing these services
(e.g. a processor, main memory, and a hard disk for creating the PDF file). However, an
agent that is requesting a service is unaware of the resources the requested service requires
to be carried out.
Figure 1.1 illustrates the CATNETS scenario. A complex service is requesting a PDF
creator service, which will be allocated to the agent. Furthermore, the required resources
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Figure 1.1: CATNETS Scenario: Service Market and Resource Market
(CPU and hard disk) are allocated to the service. The service acts as a trading interme-
diary, i.e. the service knows what the agents are demanding and which resources are
available for executing the services.
In the next section the CATNETS approach is compared with other resource manage-
ment systems.
1.3 State of the art: Market-based Resource Manage-
ment Systems
There are several ways to classify market-based resource management systems. In the
following the classification will follow the lines of Buyya et al and will sketch the related
projects to CATNETS [BSGA01] [YB04]. Essentially, the taxonomy is structured around
the market mechanisms, which are incorporated in the resource management system. It
will be differentiated into the following market mechanisms:
Posted Price In posted price settings the price is revealed openly to all participants. As
we have shown in our preceding motivation, the posted price is inadequate from an
economic point of view if demand and/or supply are strongly fluctuating.
Commodity Market In a commodity market, the resource owners determine their pric-
ing policy and the user determines accordingly his/her amount of resources to con-
sume. Pricing can depend on the parameters such as usage time (e.g. peak-load
pricing) or usage quantity (e.g. price discrimination) [WPBB01b]. In many cases,
it is referred to flat rates, which boils down to fixed price until a certain amount of
resources or a certain time is reached.
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Bargaining In bargaining markets, resource owners and users negotiate bilaterally for
mutually agreeable prices [SS03] [Wol88] [FS01]. By gradually lowering their
claims, resource owners and users eventually reach an agreement. Logrolling for
several attributes can also be included in the bargaining protocol [KSL04] [RZ94].
Contract Net Protocol In the contract net protocol the user advertises its demand and
invites resource owners to submit bids. Resource owners check these advertise-
ments with respect to their requirements. In case, the advertisement is favorable the
resource owners respond with bids. The user consolidates all bids, compares them
and selects the most favorable bids(s).
Proportional Share Proportional Share assigns resources proportionally to the bids sub-
mitted by the users.
Auctions Auctions are mediated market mechanisms. An auctioneer collects bids from
either one market side (buyers or sellers) or from both. According to the auction
rules (which are known to all bidders) the auctioneer allocates the resources. Typ-
ical one-sided auctions are the English, First-Price Sealed Bid, Dutch and Vickrey
auction. Two sided auctions are the Double Auctions.
A survey using the above mentioned taxonomy over selected market-based resource
management systems are summarized in the following [Neu05].
Computing
Platform
Market-
based
RMS
Market
Mecha-
nism
Description
Parallel
and Dis-
tributed
Systems
SPAWN Auction The SPAWN system provides a market mech-
anism for trading CPU times in a network of
workstations [WHH 92]. SPAWN treats com-
puter resources as standardized commodities
and implements a standard Vickrey auction. It
is known from auction theory that the Vickrey
auction attains (1) truthful preference revela-
tion and (2) an efficient allocation of resources
[Kri02]. However, SPAWN does not make use
of the generalized Vickrey auction, which can
cope with complementarities. Furthermore, the
Vickrey auction can traditionally neither cope
with multiple attributes nor with different time
slots.
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 9
Peer-to-
Peer
Stanford
Peers
Bargaining The Stanford Peers model is a Peer-to-Peer sys-
tem which implements auctions within a coop-
erative bartering model in a cooperative sharing
environment [WBPB03]. It simulates storage
trading for content replication and archiving. It
demonstrates distributed resource trading poli-
cies based on auctions by simulation.
Internet POPCORN Auction POPCORN provides an infrastructure for
global distributed computation [RN98]
[NLRC88]. POPCORN mainly consists of
three entities: (i) A parallel program which
requires CPU time (buyer), (ii) a CPU seller,
and (iii) a market which serves as meeting place
and matchmaker for the buyers and sellers.
Buyers of CPU time can bid for one single
commodity, which can be traded executing
a Vickrey auction repeatedly. POPCORN
obviously suffers under the same shortcomings
as SPAWN.
Grids Bellagio Auction Bellagio is intended to serve as a resource dis-
covery and resource allocation system for dis-
tributed computing infrastructures. Users ex-
press preferences for resources using a bidding
language, which support XOR bids. The bids
are formulated in virtual currency. The auction
employed in Bellagio is periodic. Bids from
users are only accepted as long as enough vir-
tual currency is left [ACSV04].
Grids G-
Commerce
Commodity
market,
auction
G-Commerce provides a framework for trad-
ing computer resources (CPU and hard disk)
in commodity markets and Vickrey auctions
[WPBB01a] [WPBB01b] [WBPB03]. While
the Vickrey auction has the aforementioned
shortcomings in grid, the commodity market
typically works with standardized products.
Additionally, the commodity market cannot ac-
count for the complementarities among the re-
sources, as only one leg of the bundle is auc-
tioned off, exposing the bidder to the threshold
risk.
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Grids Nimrod/G Commodity
market
Nimrod/G enables users to define the types of
resources needed and negotiate with the system
for the use of a particular set of resources at a
particular price [BA00]. This requires from the
system to conduct resource discovery, which
can become quite complex, as the numbers of
re-sources can be large. Also, does the system
need to support price negotiations, which may
be complex as well. Both resource discovery
and negotiation can become very cumbersome,
if the users demand bundles instead of single re-
sources.
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Grids OCEAN Bargaining/
Contract
net
OCEAN (Open Computation Exchange and
Arbitration Network) is a market-based in-
frastructure for high-performance computation,
such as Cluster and Grid computing environ-
ments [ACD 01] [PHP 03]. The major com-
ponents of the OCEAN’s market infrastruc-
ture are user components, computational re-
sources, and the underlying market mechanism
(e.g. the OCEAN Auction Component). In the
OCEAN framework, each user (i.e. resource
provider or consumer) is represented by a lo-
cal OCEAN node. The OCEAN node imple-
ments the core components of the system, for
instance a Trader Component, an Auction Com-
ponent, or a Security Component. The imple-
mented OCEAN auctions occur in a distributed
Peer-to-Peer manner. The auction mechanism
implemented in the OCEAN framework can be
interpreted as a distributed sealed-bid continu-
ous double-auction [ACD 01]. A trade is pro-
posed to the highest bidder and the lowest seller.
Afterwards, the trading partner can renegotiate
their service level agreements. The renegotia-
tion possibility one the one hand allows to cope
with multiple attributes and with the assignment
of resources to time slots. Nonetheless, the ne-
gotiation makes the results of the transparent
auction obsolete. Neither the auction can en-
fold its full potential, nor can the negotiation
guarantee to achieve an efficient allocation, as
competition is trimmed.
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 12
Grids Tycoon Proportional
Share
P2P clusters like the Grid and PlanetLab en-
able in principle the same statistical multiplex-
ing efficiency gains for computing as the Inter-
net provides for networking. Tycoon is a mar-
ket based distributed resource allocation sys-
tem based on an Auction Share scheduling al-
gorithm [LHF04]. Tycoon distinguishes itself
from other systems in that it separates the allo-
cation mechanism (which provides incentives)
from the agent strategy (which interprets pref-
erences). This simplifies the system and allows
specialization of agent strategies for different
applications while providing incentives for ap-
plications to use re-sources efficiently and re-
source providers to provide valuable resources.
Tycoon’s distributed markets allow the system
to be fault tolerant and to allocate resources
with low latency. Auction Share is the local
scheduling component of Tycoon.
Table 1.1: Overview of market-based resource management
systems (adapted from [Neu05, YB04])
In contracts to the presented market-based resource management system, the trading
od the CATNETS project is divided into two layers, the application/service layer and the
resource layer. On both layers, the participants have varying objectives which change
dynamically and unpredictably over time. The following remaining sections of this de-
liverable show in detail what are the objectives of the project and in particular WP 1, and
how this market is designed and realized.
1.4 Objective of WP1
The objective of working package 1 (WP1: Theoretical and Computational Basis) in this
project is to engineer a market place for the CATNETS scenario of two connected markets.
This can be achieved by designing (interdependent) market mechanisms for allocating
the services among the agents and for allocating and scheduling the resources among the
services in two different markets: the service market and the resource market.
The allocation can principally be conducted in a centralized, using economic resource
brokers, or in a decentralized fashion, using self-organizing market mechanisms. The dif-
ficulty in designing such markets is that the underlying mechanisms through which the
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participants act can have a profound impact on the results of that interaction [Jac02]. For
instance, in a sealed bid auction the bidders simultaneously submit bids to the auctioneer
without knowledge of the amount bid by other participants. In contrast, all bids under an
open cry auction are available for everyone to see. Thus, in a sealed bid auction mecha-
nism the participants do not learn as much about the valuations of the other participants as
in an open cry auction. The higher information feedback may affect the bidding behavior
of the market participants and could therefore lead to different outcomes. Furthermore,
the market infrastructure (e.g. ways of communication) as well as the business structure
(e.g. trading fees) can also influence the behavior of the participants and therefore the
outcome of the mechanism [WHN03, Neu04a].
The Market Engineering approach chosen in this WP manages these influences by
means of a structured, systematic, and theoretically profound procedure of analyzing,
designing, evaluating, and introducing electronic market platforms [WHN03].
Appropriating the methodology of Market Engineering – which will be introduced in
Section 2 – the following objectives constitute the outline of this report: In Chapter 3, the
service market will be analyzed and the requirements a mechanism for this scenario has
to fulfill will be defined. Furthermore, a centralized and decentralized mechanism will be
designed which fit the defined requirements. In Chapter 4, the resource market will be
analyzed and characterized, as well as the requirements for this market will be elicited.
A central and decentral mechanism will be presented for the resource market scenario.
Finally, Chapter 6 summarizes the contribution and gives an overview on future work.
Chapter 2
Market Engineering
In the general context of engineering, a design method refers to a way, procedure, or
technique for solving an individual design problem1. These design methods can be either
intuitive or discursive:
• Intuitive approaches involve creativity in the form of complex associations of ideas
and aim at increasing the flow of ideas (e.g. using the Delphi method [PB84]).
However, the results of intuitive approaches strongly depend on the designer’s ex-
pertise, skills, and experiences. As such, intuitive approaches may fail to achieve
suitable solutions for complex problems.
• Discursive approaches are strategies which decompose a complex design problem
into several smaller, less complex problems. The design strategy intends to describe
a step-by-step procedure to aid the designer in the matching of the unique problem
situation along the overall design process with the available design methods.
The design of a market mechanism is a complex and interdependent task. Therefore,
the approach of Market Engineering aims at the discursive, goal-oriented development of
market institutions.
The Market Engineering Process Model is built upon the engineering design model
proposed by [PB84]. In essence, the choice of the engineering design approach allows
the explicit anchoring of two fundamental desiderata into the Market Engineering process
model:
1. Utilization of economic models in the design process and
2. The use of behavioural and cognitive models to determine the needs and require-
ments of the potential customers and stakeholders.
1Parts of this text are taken from [Neu04a]
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The first desideratum is very powerful, as it allows the integration of economic mod-
eling into the Market Engineering process. Market Engineering hence is not neglecting
prior work on the field of economic design, but can incorporate it into the process. Eco-
nomic design is essentially concerned with social effects in markets derived from the
analysis of abstract resource allocation mechanisms. Analogous to engineering design
that deduces solution principles on the basis of physical effects, Market Engineering can
make use of the social effects2 to derive solution principles. The second desideratum is
also of great importance in the design of market mechanism, as it primarily addresses
social issues with many different customers involved. As such, the engineering design
template is additionally enriched by elements of the service development process devel-
oped in marketing [SJ89].
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Figure 2.1: Stages of the Market Engineering Process
The corresponding Market Engineering process model and a selection of associated
methods are outlined in figure 2.1 [WHN03] and briefly described in the following. The
objectives and the strategy that governs the Market Engineering approach stand at the
outset of the Market Engineering process. In the first stage – the environmental analy-
sis – the requirements of the new market mechanism are deduced. In the second stage,
the new market mechanism is designed and implemented. Having implemented the ap-
2Social effects are here defined very broadly as all regularities that depend on specific interpersonal
interactions.
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propriate market mechanism, it is tested upon its economic properties and its operational
functionality in the third stage. Finally, the market platform is introduced.
At any stage of the Market Engineering process, there is a decision to be made whether
to proceed with the next step or to repeat the prior one. The use of prototypes is again
possible at any stage of the process, so that they are left out in the figure. The Market
Engineering process not only structures the design process but also provides the designer
with a whole array of methods that may support the individual sub-tasks. In the following
each stage of the process is described particularly.
A detailed description of the single stages and the associated methods can be found in
[Neu04a] and [Hol04].
2.1 Phase 1: Environmental Analysis
The environmental analysis stands at the outset of the market-engineering process. Basi-
cally, the term environment is used to describe the set of all individual circumstances in
a market that are outside the control of the mechanism designer [Hur73]. Among others,
these circumstances can be the number of potential participants, the characteristics of the
participants (e.g., preferences, risk aversion), their social relations among each other, the
characteristics of the resources, or the individual resource endowments [Smi89]. Since
the performance of market mechanisms is inherently dependent on the underlying en-
vironment, the design of a market mechanism requires profound knowledge about the
environment.
The environmental analysis is triggered by the specification of the objectives and the
strategy of the designer. Objective of the environmental analysis stage is twofold: Firstly,
the identification of a promising market segment for which a market mechanism is con-
sidered. Secondly, the analysis of the requirements potential adopters may have regarding
the market mechanism. Corresponding with the engineering design process, this stage
comprises two different phases: the environment definition and the requirement analysis.
2.1.1 Environment Definition
The central intuition of the environment definition phase is to pinpoint the environment
for which subsequently the market mechanism is offered. The environment definition
is clearly a marketing task. To systematize the phase more thoroughly, the environment
definition is divided into three subsequent activities:
1. Market Definition,
2. Market Segmentation, and
3. Market Targeting.
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Firstly, the relevant market is defined. In other words, the market designer is ”carving
out the arena in which it is going to compete for business” [FA03]. The market definition
thus comprises information about the potential market participants, their geographical
positions, their specific needs, and so forth. In short, the market definition3 characterizes
the demand-side for the market mechanism that is eventually determined by the definition
of the trading object.
Secondly – having defined the relevant market – the designer divides the defined mar-
ket into several segments. The division into segments is intended to disaggregate total
demand into smaller pieces of demand. The smaller pieces of demand are ideally of ho-
mogenous nature such that it is easier to fine-tune the market mechanism to the needs of
this market segment [FA03, Smi56].
Thirdly, the market segments are evaluated against each other. As a result, the target
market consisting of one or more market segments is selected [HR86].
2.1.2 Requirement Analysis
Basically, the target market segment reveals the environment for which the market mech-
anism is intended. In order to gain potential agents as customers, the market mechanism
must match with the particular needs of the agents. The requirement analysis phase con-
sists of a thorough extraction of the potential customers’ needs concerning the resource
allocation problem and the environmental side-constraints [BCZ92, SSS00]. In other
words, the requirement analysis seeks to describe the socio-economic environment con-
sisting of the (potential) number of agents, their preference structure and risk attitude,
the number of resources to be offered, their characteristics, and the agents’ endowment.
[Cra03] summarizes this as follows: ”Good market design begins with a thorough under-
standing of the market participants, their incentives, and the economic problem that the
market is trying to solve”.
In summary, the result of the requirement analysis ideally comprises the following
aspects: a description of the socio-economic environment (agents, resources, and prefer-
ences), the legal framework, and a requirement list what objectives the market mechanism
must attain, and lastly what properties it must have.
2.2 Phase 2: Design and Implementation
The second stage – headlined as design and implementation – comprises the actual design
process. It commences when the design problem has been sufficiently specified. Obvi-
3The terms market definition, segmentation, and targeting have been established in marketing for a long
time. As such, these terms are also used in this report, although the definition of the term ”market” is not
exactly corresponding with the institutional definition given here. What marketing literature addresses with
the term ”market” is the environment, whereas the market mechanisms are left out.
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ously, the aim of this phase is twofold. Firstly, the conceptual design of an appropriate
market mechanism on the blackboard, and, secondly, its transformation into a running
software system. Following the engineering design process, the design and implementa-
tion stage is decomposed into four major phases being the conceptual design, embodiment
design, detail design and implementation
2.2.1 Conceptual Design
The second stage – headlined as design and implementation – comprises the actual design
process. It commences when the design problem has been sufficiently specified.
The conceptual design step hallmarks the peculiarity that distinguishes the Market
Engineering from the service development process. Essentially the design problem is
abstracted in a way that the design object is abstracted to its functions. As the design
object is the market mechanism, it has the function to allocate resources, provide the
customers with information, enforce the allocation, and sue infringements and so on.
The recourse to abstraction simply means ”ignoring what is particular or incidental and
emphasizing what is general and essential” [PB84].
Those functions are further divided into sub-functions reducing the overall complexity
of the design problem. Then, the sub-functions are distinguished into important (i.e.
main) or less important (i.e. auxiliary) functions. Important functions are tackled within
the conceptual design phase, whereas the design of auxiliary functions is postponed to the
embodiment phase.
Transferred to Market Engineering, the functions are also solved by means of social
effects [Ore01]. Different than in engineering design, the entities that cause these effects
are not form attributes of material, but a set of rules. For example, the designer may
want to satisfy the function of an efficient resource allocation. In this case, the designer
searches for market mechanisms that achieve this function.
The resulting abstract solution descriptions to all functions are aggregated into con-
cepts. The concepts are furthermore supplemented by a calculation of profitability pre-
dicting the chances of the envisioned market mechanism in the competition. Finally, it is
decided upon which concept – including abstract descriptions of the service enriched by
profitability estimates – is further adopted.
2.2.2 Embodiment Design
While the conceptual design phase is concerned with the formulation of the problem and
the search for abstract solutions, the embodiment design refines the abstract concepts to
blueprints. A blueprint denotes a model that is more concrete than the concepts, but
still independent of implementation details. In other words, the concept comprises at
most a verbal description of the market mechanism. As such, many different blueprints
CHAPTER 2. MARKET ENGINEERING 19
can be found that realize the same concept. During the embodiment design this verbal
descriptions are transformed into a model with sufficiently low level of abstraction that
traditional design techniques may be applied in order to implement it.
The main difficulty in embodiment design is that commonly ”developers translate the
subjective description of a need into an operational concept that may bear only the remote
resemblance of the original idea” [Sho84]. As blueprints are, ”[     ] more precise than
verbal descriptions of the service processes and therefore reduce ambiguity and the likeli-
hood of misunderstandings that may originate from them” [HRRM00]. Furthermore, the
technique of blueprinting almost prevents the designer from conceptual errors, because
the blueprint allows ” [     ] the creation, study, and testing of services conceptually on
paper before costly implementation” [HRRM00]. There are many methods that satisfy
these four objectives of blueprints. The most common models that are presented in the
context of blueprinting are flow diagrams or PERT (i.e. program evaluation and review
technique) charts4 [HRRM00, Sho82, Sho84]. The methodology Blueprinting tailored to
embodiment design converting concepts into protocols is described in [Neu04b].
2.2.3 Detail Design and Implementation
The detail design phase starts out with the layout, which describes the central aspects of
the system, but is still at a level that is not implementable. Detail design further refines the
layout into a fully-fledged system model that is subsequently implemented. Apparently,
this phase accounts for the software engineering effort in Market Engineering.
From the software development point of view, the precedent design phases of the Mar-
ket Engineering process can be subsumed under the term requirement analysis. Different
than the traditional sequence of interviews, or the use of Joint Application Development
(JAD) meetings conducted by professional modellers, the Market Engineering process
provides the designers with a systematic approach to collect design information from the
experts. In other words, the precedent design phases of the market design process con-
verts the activities of gathering, figuring out, and communicating what to build [HB95]
into a closed discursive approach5.
By doing so, the Market Engineering process supports the arguably most important
step in the requirement analysis [DHJM99].
Once the designer has a clear idea how the market mechanism will look like (by
means of the layout), an ordinary software development process can be started. State-
4Broadly speaking, PERT charts visualize tasks, durations, and dependencies among task. Each chart
starts with an initial node from which the first task(s) originates. The tasks are represented by arrows, which
indicate the identifiers of the tasks, the durations, the number of people assigned to them, and sometimes
even the names of the employees involved. The arrow points at another node, which identifies the start of
another task, or the beginning of any slack time. Related techniques are CPM or GANTT charts.
5The Market Engineering process thereby follows the four phases of the requirement analysis, concep-
tual design, logical design, validation and formal specification proposed by [BCZ92, Zmu83].
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of-the art approaches like the V-model [Som01, TH93] supplemented by methods such as
the FUSION [CAB 94] or Coad/Yourdon [CY91] and tools such as UML [OF99, RJB99]
are available such that the software engineering process will not further be elaborated.
Detail design is, however, more than software engineering – detail design phase is
also concerned with the concretization of the business rules. Up to this point, only the
key data concerning the business rules such as target costs and price ranges for the market
mechanism exist. Once the properties of the market are clarified, reliable pricing schemes
can be developed.
The end of the detail design and implementation is reached, when the market mecha-
nism is fully implemented.
2.3 Phase 3: Testing
Having implemented the market mechanism, it is tested. Stage 3 denotes, however, not
testing in general but the final acceptance test before the market mechanism is rolled out.
The inclusion of a separated testing stage may also account for the case that the designer
has sourced the implementation task out. The designer will then only accept the software
system if it passes their acceptance testing. Apparently, the inclusion of a testing stage
does certainly not exclude testing along the entire design process; it rather provides the
designer with decision support whether or not the system can be launched in the field.
Nevertheless, the term acceptance testing is used here in a broad sense meaning all
activities ”used in quality control operations to decide between acceptance and rejection
of production lots based upon an inspection of selected items” [MCM75]. What is tested
is the software quality, and the quality of the service. While the former testing checks the
functionality of the service system, the latter refers to the outcome of the market mecha-
nism in economic terms (such as efficiency). Thus, the testing stage comprises two dif-
ferent testing phases before release: functionality and concerning economic performance
testing.
When the market mechanism passed through the functionality (acceptance) test, it is
tested concerning its economic performance. Now the question arises, how economic
performance can be evaluated? This question is extremely difficult, as the outcome is
determined by the behaviour of the agents and not by the mechanism. Milgrom sum-
marizes the problems with behaviour as follows: ”Behaviour is neither perfectly stable
over time, nor the same across individuals, nor completely predictable for any single in-
dividual. Useful analyses must be cognizant of these realities” [Mil04]. In the discipline
of economic engineering there are two approaches to address the evaluation problem of
institutions:
• Axiomatic Approach
• Experimental Approach
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The axiomatic approach imposes a couple assumptions upon human behaviour and
calculates equilibrium strategies. With those equilibrium strategies, the performance of
the institution can be calculated.
Alternatively, the experimental approach exposes humans to the institution, who will
autonomously form their strategy. To make the laboratory experiment comparable, the
demand and supply situation is induced to the participating human by means of a mone-
tary incentive scheme. Hence, the performance of an institution depends on the real social
interplay among the agents.
2.4 Phase 4: Introduction
After the pilot, the electronic market service can be introduced on a full-scale. Market
engineering understood as the design of the institutional rules ends with the post-launch
review, which measures the customer acceptance right after rolling out the service. Holis-
tic market engineering continues, however. With the introduction of the electronic market
service the operation cycle will be initiated.
Chapter 3
Specifications of the Service Market
3.1 Environmental Analysis
When designing a market mechanism, one has to be aware of the underlying environment
for which the market mechanism is to be designed. Thereby, the environment description
embraces information about the potential market participants, their needs, the character-
istics of the traded resources, and their endowments. Once the environment description
is available, the designer can elicit the requirements for the market mechanism from the
potential participants of that particular environment [Neu04a].
Corresponding to the engineering design process, the design stage comprises two dif-
ferent phases: the environment definition and the requirement analysis.
3.1.1 Environment Definition
Participants
The market for trading services is spanned around basic services as sellers1 and complex
services as buyers:
Complex Service A complex service is a modular software application which needs a set
of basic service capabilities for fulfilling its goals. An internal logic translates the
requirements of a complex service to a set or sequence of modular basic services.
Basic Service A basic service is a module includable in a complex service.
For example, a complex service is part of a business service network providing PDF
creations. This service needs a sequence of two basic services, a PDF creation service
1From a technical point of view, a service can be interpreted as an agent trading different services during
a specific time span.
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and a payment service. He combines them to a value-added business service.
The services in the form of sellers sell a set of basic services and are responsible for
providing the traded basic services to the buyers and for procuring the required resources
for the services on the resource market (cf. chapter 4).
Continuing our example, the PDF basic service (seller) is responsible for providing
the PDF creation (in form of the PDF creation service) as well as the required resources
(e.g. computation and storage service for the conversion).
The number of participants as well as the number of tradable services in the service
market is difficult to determine. In practice, there exists no comparable market at the
moment. However, related distributed information systems (e.g. Seti@Home, Gnutella)
as well as large scaled markets (e.g. the XETRA market mechanisms of Deutsche Bo¨rse2)
may be a clue for determining the number of participants and the number of different
services:
Seti@Home Seti@Home was founded at the UC Berkeley and enables users to par-
ticipate in the search for extra-terrestrial intelligence by analyzing data from the
Serendip radio telescope in Puerto Rico3. Seti@Home is a distributed system with
a central coordinator. Seti@Home has more than 5.000.000 people participating in
the network and more than 10.000 active users per day [Set05].
Gnutella Gnutella is a Peer-to-Peer file sharing system which allows users the worldwide
access and provision of information (e.g. music files). [AH00] analyze the network
traffic and observe in a 24-hour period more than 35.000 connected peers.
XETRA XETRA (Exchange Electronic Trading) is a worldwide electronic securities
trading system operated by the Deutsche Boerse Group in Germany. XETRA im-
plements a centralized auctioneer and, in peak times, handles at the German Stock
Exchange more than 500.000 orders a day [AG05].
Analyzing related systems and mechanisms gives a first impression of the number of
participants and the number of tradable services. However, a detailed analysis has to be
made in conjunction with the technical analysts within the simulation WP (WP2: Simu-
lation) in the CATNETS project, as well as also complexity constraints of the simulation
environment have to be considered.
Regarding the work done in WP2 (simulation), the simulator that will be selected
for CATNETS must allow the simulation of Grids having up to 70 sites. This can be
enlarged by an increasing number of agents per site (as also described in [Zin05] for the
OptorSim simulator). Thus, the scalability requirements mainly depend on the simulator’s
capabilities. However, the objective is to scale the number of participants as high as
possible.
2http://www.deutsche-boerse.de, 30/07/2005
3See http://setiathome.ssl.berkeley.edu/ for details (accessed: 04.02.2005).
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Transaction Objects
The products traded on the service market are completely standardized. There are no qual-
ity or capability differences between service instances of a specific service type. Quality
of service (QoS) levels are modeled defining new service types. As such, an instance of
a ”gold”-QoS-level instance of a PDF creator traded once does not differ from a ”gold”-
QoS-level PDF creator instance traded at a later time. But, a ”silver”-QoS-level PDF
creator instance differs from a ”gold”-QoS-level PDF creator instance.
3.1.2 Requirement Analysis
Having analyzed the participants and the traded products of the service market, the re-
quirements which an adequate market mechanism for this environment has to fulfill can
be elicited.
The theoretical basis for designing auctions has emerged from a part of game theory
called mechanism design [Jac02]. A mechanism   specifies the available messages and
the rules how to resolve it via clearing and price rules. Formally, a mechanism  is a pair
(  
 
) where  is the language and 
 
represents the resulting allocation  and prices
. For any message profile    , the mechanism   computes the resulting allocation
and prices as an equilibrium solution. Within the scope of practical mechanism design,
it is the primary goal to investigate a mechanism that is applicable in certain situations
and which attains an allocation that has desirable properties. As such, for tailoring an
adequate mechanism for trading services in the Service Market, it is necessary that the
mechanism accounts for the well-accepted properties an requirements from economic
theory and mechanism design [Jac02]. Furthermore, the requirements stemming from the
environment of the service market have to be considered.
Requirements stemming from the theory of Mechanism Design
The theory of mechanism design takes a systematic look at market mechanisms and their
outcomes based on game theory [Jac02]. Within the scope of mechanism design it is
the goal to investigate a mechanism that is applicable in certain situations. Achieving
this objective, the designed mechanism has to fulfill the following general requirements
[Jac02, Par01, Neu04a]:
Allocative efficiency: The mechanism should determine an efficient allocation. Assum-
ing transferable utility among all participants, this is achieved if the total value over
all participants is maximized. Allocative efficiency can be defined in an ex-post
and ex-ante sense. Ex-ante efficiency takes preferences over expected allocations
in consideration, whilst ex-post analyses preferences over realized allocations. A
mechanism can only attain allocative efficiency if the market participants report
their valuation truthfully. This requires incentive compatibility in equilibrium
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Incentive compatibility: A mechanism is required to be incentive compatible. This is
the case if all participants report their preferences truthfully. Participants may not
have an incentive to untruthfully report their preferences in order to increase their
individual utility. A mechanism is strategy-proofed if truthful revelation of the
preferences is a dominant-strategy equilibrium.
Budget balance: The property of budget balance is concerned with whether the mech-
anism requires payments from outside the system or not. A mechanism is budget
balanced if all payments made to the mechanism are redistributed among the par-
ticipants. Neither funds from the system are removed nor is the system subsidized
from outside. A weaker property is the concept of weak budged balance, i.e. net
payments are made from the participants to the mechanism, but no net payment
from the mechanism to the participants.
Individual rational: The constraint of individual rationality requires that the utility after
participating in the mechanism must be greater or equal than before. Otherwise the
participants would decide not to take part in the mechanism.
Computational tractability: Computational tractability considers the complexity of
computing the outcome of a mechanism based on the agent’s strategies [KP03].
With an increasing size of the message space, the allocation problem can become
very demanding. Computational constraints may delimit the design of choice and
transfer rules.
Communication complexity: Communication complexity considers the minimization
of the amount of communication that is required to converge at a desirable global
outcome of the mechanism [San99b]. With an increasing number of participants, it
is required that the communication effort is minimized.
Requirements stemming from the service market environment
The requirements elicited from the mechanism design theory do, however, not fulfill all
requirements for the service market in the CATNETS scenario. The underlying envi-
ronment and its properties stem for more detailed and domain specific requirements as
elicited in the following:
Simultaneous trading: The mechanism for the service market requires that multiple
sellers (basic services) and multiple buyers (complex services) can trade simul-
taneously. This installs competition on both sides of the market.
Immediate service allocation: It is required that suitable buyer orders are matched im-
mediately (or within a short time range) with suitable seller orders.
No partial execution: The mechanism is required to avoid partial executions of services.
This is caused by the fact, that a partial execution of a service is useless for a buyer.
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3.2 Meeting the Requirements – Related Work
The analysis of the service market results in a negotiation of a single attribute, the price
for requesting one service instance, which fulfils additionally the three requirements from
above. Using market-based control as a paradigm for controlling the service market leads
to simple interaction of trading, i.e. buying and selling a service, among individual agents.
Markets in general do not guarantee an optimal solution but they often achieve satisfac-
tory results. First, related work of centralized mechanisms for resource allocation on the
service market and second related work of decentralized economic resource allocation
concepts are presented in the following sections.
3.2.1 Centralized Mechanisms
As shown in the environmental analysis (cf. Section 3.1), services can be characterized as
standardized resources. In this context, the use of auctions is an efficient way to allocate
these standardized resource, as well as to determine its prices. An auction is characterized
as a market institution with an explicit set of rules determining resource allocation and
prices on the basis of bids from the market participants [MM87].
At the moment, there are many auction schemas successfully applied in practice: for
instance, Ebay4 or Amazon5 apply variations of English auctions for their trading plat-
forms. Several double auction mechanisms were successfully applied in the financial
domain (e.g. for trading stocks), the electricity domain, or the general B2B area. Thus,
the application of auctions for trading services is deemed promising.
Treating auctions for standardized resources, single sided and double sided auction
formats are usually analyzed and will be introduced in the following. Figure 3.1 represents
a classification schema for a set of relevant auctions formats based on [WWW01]. For
a detailed description of the capabilities and properties of these auction mechanisms, the
reader is refereed to [WWW01] and [Neu04a].
Single Sided Auctions
Single sided auctions are mechanisms, where only buyers or sellers can submit bids or
asks (     or     relations). The most prominent single sided auctions are the Vickrey
Auction, the Dutch Auction, and the English Auction.
Single sided auctions are – from an economic point-of-view – well understood and
applied successfully in different domains. However, single-sided auctions do not enable
the simultaneous trading of multiple buyers and multiple sellers. Reviewing the defined
4http://www.ebay.com/
5http://www.amazon.com/
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Figure 3.1: Auction classification schema according to [WWW01]
requirements in section 3.1.2, these auction types cannot be applied for the service market
in CATNETS.
Double Sided Auctions
Double-sided auctions or shortly double auctions are those auctions where competitive
bidding takes places on both sides (     relation). In comparison to traditional single-
sided auctions, double auctions have received much less attention by modern economic
theory.
For double auctions, where many buyers and many sellers compete against each other,
it is difficult to game-theoretically model the strategic behavior of buyers and sellers
[MM87]. Thus, theoretical models typically focus on the very simple two sided insti-
tutions, where agents engage directly in bargaining over the terms of exchange.
The review of the requirements elicited in section 3.1.2 implies, that the implementa-
tion of a double auction fits the defined requirements for the CATNETS’ service market.
Single sided auctions have the drawback to be either provider- or consumer-oriented and
thus asymmetric. Double auctions enable providers and consumers to offer bids simul-
taneously and thus, the application of a double auction for the service market is deemed
promising. Furthermore, the requirements stemmed from the theory of mechanism design
(cf. Section 3.1.2) can be (approximate) fulfilled by a double auction:
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It is possible to design an (approximate) efficient6, budget balanced, individual ra-
tional, and (approximate) incentive compatible double auction mechanism. Furthermore,
the computational and communication complexities of a double auction are manageable
in large-scaled markets. For instance, the XETRA system at the German Stock Exchange
also implements a (modified version) of a double auction and handles more than 500.000
orders a day [AG05].
Furthermore, the requirements coming from the environment of the service market
(i.e. simultaneous trading, immediate execution, no partial executions) are also fulfilled
by a double auction.
3.2.2 Decentralized Mechanisms
The centralized market uses a double auction on the service market, which is widely
accepted in the auction theory and practice. Most of the current research is done in the
centralized and hierarchical approaches, because the decentralized approach comes along
with a loss of system control and thus has problems with widely acceptance. Therefore,
the following description of related work describes fractions, which have to be brought
together to get the economic behavior of von Hayek’s vision.
The predictability issue is the main problem with a central control. No omniscient
controller exists in the real world. Contrast to the centralized auctioneer, there is no need
of any agents in the system to know all the parameters of the system in order for the
system to function smoothly. A market-based system necessarily is easy to expand and
maintain since there is no need for a central coordinator.
All complex systems share common dynamical behaviors. These possible behaviors
are: stability, transient instability, persistent oscillation, deterministic chaos, and random
motion, which in turn are characterized by parameters of the system [Cle96]. Depending
on the values of the parameters the system shows one or several of these behaviors. The
parameters characterize the communication paths between the entities in the system, the
efficiency of the communication, the time delays for communication, the accuracy of
response and the overall response of the entities, and the expectation of the agents.
In the decentralized mechanism the market-based control emerges from the interaction
of individual goals of the agents rather than having a central goal imposed from above.
Friedrich August von Hayek [HBKC89] and other Neo-Austrian economists understood
markets as decentralized coordination mechanisms, as opposed to a centralized command
economy control. In addition to macroeconomic thoughts, Hayek’s work also provides
concrete insight into the working mechanisms of economic coordination. However, a
formal description of this self-organizing market mechanism does not so far exist. The
Catallaxy concept is based on the explicit assumption of self-interested actions of the par-
6[MS83] show that there cannot be any double auction (exchange) which is efficient, budget balanced,
and individual rational at the same time. However, [PKE01] show that the efficiency of an exchange can be
approximated while cleaving on the budget balance and individual rational properties.
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ticipants, who try to maximize their own utility and choose their actions under incomplete
information and bounded rationality [Sim57]. The term Catallaxy comes from the Greek
word katallatein, which means to barter and at the same time to join a community. The
goal of Catallaxy is to arrive at a state of coordinated actions, through the bartering and
communicating of members, to achieve a community goal that no single user has planned
for. The main characteristics of the Catallaxy [Hop99] are enumerated below. Each prop-
erty imposes several requirements upon the design of an information system embodying
a Catallactic approach.
1. Participants work for their own interest to gain income. Every system element is
a utility maximizing entity, supports means to measure and compare income and
utility, and to express a desire to reach a defined goal.
2. Participants can only estimate the effect of action alternatives on an income or util-
ity maximization goal, as nobody has total knowledge and foresight of the envi-
ronment. Instead, ”constitutional ignorance” of the rationally bounded participants
makes it inevitably impossible to know the exact environment state. For large and
very dynamic information systems, this observation leads to a design shift. Instead
of trying to overcome this limitation by central means, e.g. through synchronization
of the system by introducing round-based brokerage, the focus shifts to improving
the computational intelligence of the actions to decide under uncertainty, and to
adapt to constantly changing signals from the outside.
3. Participants communicate using commonly accessible markets, where they barter
about access to resources held by other participants. The development of prices for a
specific good, relative to alternatives, and whether they are increasing or decreasing,
leads buyers to look for alternative sources of procurement and thus enhances the
dynamics of the market. In that view, a market is simply a communication bus; not
a central optimization component, or a mechanism or a protocol.
Decentralized mechanisms, like in most file sharing networks, e.g. Gnutella [AH00]
or Kazaa, have no central point to collect supply and demand before matching. Each client
decides for himself which service provider to match to based on technical parameters like
estimated download time. APPLES [CO00], WINNER [AF99] or MARS [GAR96] are
other examples for localized control. The problem of localized control is the missing
assurance on allocation stability [WJB03].
All these complex system perform their resource allocation using technical metrics
without market-based control.
In the decentralized architecture an iterative bilateral negotiation protocol, similar to
a contract-net, is used as no complete information is available. Both agents approximate
to the trade-off point in iterative steps exchanging offers and counter-offers. This process
is described as monotonic concession protocol [RZ94].
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/ ResourceCoAllocator / LocalResourceManager/ BasicService/ ComplexService
1 : \request / cfp\
2 : \translateRequest\
3 : \request / cfp\
4 : \bargain\
5 : \propose / reject\
6 : \bargain\
7 : \propose / reject\
8 : \accept\
9 : \confirm\
10 : \inform\
11 : \propose\
12 : \bargain\
13 : \propose / reject\
14 : \bargain\
15 : \propose / reject\
16 : \bargain\
17 : \accept\
18 : \confirm\
19 : \invokeService / pay\
20 : \pay\
Figure 3.2: UML sequence diagram of the negotiation between the market participants.
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A preliminary model of our protocol is shown in figure 3.2. The participants on the
service market are the complex service and the basic service, and on the resource market
the resource co-allocator and the local resource manager. For clarity, the basic service
is split in its buyer and seller side: basic service (seller side) and resource co-allocator
(buyer side).
The complex service requests a basic service, according to his process demand. The
basic service translates this request to resource layer and the resource co-allocator and
starts the negotiation with several local resource managers. The local resource manager
analyzes the request and creates an offer and this process iterates until an agreement (ac-
cept) or reject is reached. If an accept is reached, the resource allocator confirms and
informs the basic service about the contracted resources. The basic service continues
the negotiation with the complex service, using the information from contracting the re-
sources. The negotiation on resource layer is processed only once. It is impossible to
renegotiate a resource contract. The resuming negotiation with the complex service uses
the same negotiation protocol and after an accept the payment process is initiated which
pays the basic service and the resource. A reject on the service market will lead to a reject
ton the resource market.
However, the communication sequence shows only one possible scenario for the de-
scription of the negotiation protocol: mostly, several prospects are imaginable when re-
ceiving a proposal by an opponent: The agent could reject the proposal, accept it or
send a counter-offer. This decision should include past and forecast experiences. The
number of alternatives describes the complexity of the decision process; the more alterna-
tives exist, the bigger the search space, which increases the quest for a suitable solution.
Though, this may not exceed the time frame that is accepted by the opponent for the reply
message/counter proposal. According to [Pre98, LW00], four mechanisms/strategies for
negotiation can be differentiated:
1. Rule-based mechanisms are subject to the premise, that all possible states are com-
pletely known and the environment remains static during processing. This might be
suitable for a market with fixed catalogues, as re-consulting a catalogue with static
prices and articles will not change the decision rules. Double auctions, however,
cannot be matched, as implementing all decision alternatives when changing prices
or articles’ attributes is impossible. The conceived market model of CATNETS
will inherently comprise dynamic and complex states of the environment; therefore
rule-based mechanisms are not appropriate.
2. Argumentative mechanisms include not only the proposal for prices but also
purchase-supporting arguments which extend the negotiation dimensions. The ar-
guments highly depend on the application, thus no standards can be set and this
implicitly leads to a higher complexity in decision and modeling. Furthermore, it
exhibits a deviation of the single dimension negotiations.
3. Game-theoretic approaches assume the market situation to be a multi-stage game
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between buyer and seller. The strategy results from the analysis of the negotiation
problem. For the formulation of a result, the availability of an offer of the coun-
terpart is not necessary; the analysis can rely on prospects. The internal model of
the agent comprises a calculus which explicitly includes all probable behaviors of
the opponents. Multi Agent Systems can be implemented using Game-theoretic
approaches, but due to the high computation prerequisites, these systems may be
limited to a number of 20 agents [MTE03]. Thus, Game-theoretic approaches are
not suitable for the concerned market model, due to the scalability concerns.
4. Heuristic-adaptive approaches assume incomplete knowledge a priori, and there-
fore they also expect defective decisions. Agents adapt their strategy by relating the
behavior of the market and their own activities [SF89, SG89, CB98, BKS00]. The
counteroffer of the opponent is contemplated as feedback of the former own pro-
posal. As the whole spectrum of opponents’ proposals cannot be anticipated com-
pletely beforehand, the strategy uses forms of ”trial and error” to formulate offers.
An easy example of use is shown in [Pre98] where heuristic rules are combined
with easy learning rules. Each agent is willing to negotiate a price that is below
(buyer) respectively above (seller) its own price limit. His autonomous decision is
to determine a price for selling/buying. The market mechanism is a round-based
continuous double auction, and all agents use the same implementation. The im-
plemented heuristics determine the target price of the agents in their negotiation
steps. A number of numerical or boolean parameters determine the strategy; these
variables will be adapted during the lifetime of an agent. In MAS learning meth-
ods like neural networks [Fau94], Q-Learning [SC95], classifier systems [Hol92],
Bayesian networks [Nea96] and evolutionary algorithms [Gol93] can be identified.
This implementation is typical for realization of heuristic-adaptive strategies.
From the mentioned mechanisms, heuristic adaptive strategies show the most scal-
able behavior [Eym03] and are favored for adoption in large MAS, that are addressed in
CATNETS. To enable an adaptive behavior of the participant a learning mechanism is
necessarily required. The following section introduces the depicted learning algorithms
and evaluates them for adoption in CATNETS.
Adaption of strategy
The combination of artificial intelligence and machine learning has become increasingly
complex in the last years. Brenner [Bre02] classifies learning methods in non-conscious
learning, routine-based learning and belief learning. However, non-conscious learning
processes are discussed not to appear in experiments. They are used in well-known sit-
uations which stands in contrast to the CATNETS approach. Belief learning focuses on
the individual and not on the whole population. For global optimization, belief learning
is not to be suitable. For bilateral negotiation processes, optimizing global behavior of a
population, routine based learning strategies are most applicable. Routine based learning
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strategies describe the learning process on population level. It is acceptable, to model the
learning process not granularly on the individual level, as the emerging behavior of the
complete system is in focus of CATNETS. There are mainly two possible ways how to
implement a reinforcement learning strategy: the Roth-Erev model and evolutionary al-
gorithms. The Roth-Erev [ER98] model is a quite simple model, which is adequate for a
small, fixed set of actions and strategies. Because of being limited to a small, pre-defined
set of actions, the Roth-Erev model is not applicable of CATNETS.
Evolutionary algorithms are able to deal with a very large set of actions and strategies
and allow the sets of strategies increase endogenously. Therefore this type of algorithms
is more applicable to CATNETS. Nevertheless, both models should not be considered to
be more than quite crude approximations on a population level of real conscious learning
processes.
In economic simulations lots of research efforts on evolutionary algorithms can be
found. We selected the STDEA (Smith Taylor Decentralized Evolutionary Algorithm) for
CATNETS [SNT98]. This algorithm showed good results in the predecessor project Cat-
Net. Other possible strategies are numerical optimization procedures. Eymann and Mller
[MTE03] could show, that results in similar learning mechanisms showed very similar
results. The STDEA is a decentralized evolutionary algorithm, which means that it has
no global evaluation metric (fitness value), which is used in Genetic Algorithms [Gol93]
to separate the under performing participants. A fundamental quality of the mechanism
is the decentralized communication and fitness evaluation, using locally available data.
Every agent sends a plumage object after a successful transaction, advertising its average
income (fitness) and its genes (genotype) to all agents of the population after an evaluation
phase, i.e. after it has carried out a certain number of negotiations with this genotype. If
an agent receives a plumage object from other agents, it decides using a blindness prob-
ability, whether the plum-age object is evaluated, avoiding premature unification of the
genotype. Sender and recipient remain anonymous. If a certain maturity threshold of
received plumage is exceeded, the agent replaces his old genotype with the evolved ver-
sion after the completion of evaluation, selection, recombination and mutation phases as
in normal genetic algorithms. The mutation rate is also influencing the algorithm, which
determines the frequency and the extent of explorative behavior of the population. A
detailed explanation of the learning algorithm is presented in section 3.3.3.
When comparing with other, numerical optimization strategies [PT02] and decentral-
ized learning, it must be admitted, that e.g. Powell’s algorithm as well as the simplex
method provide better results than the STDEA, because evolutionary algorithms per-form
a routine based learning, which constitutes a slower learning process than observed in
reality. However, the substantial advantage of optimization strategies to decentralized
learning mechanisms becomes obvious if the size of the population is varied: In the case
of one single agent, the numeric algorithms take advantage of their directed search, in
contrast to the random exploration of the decentralized learning mechanisms. Increasing
the size of the population the optimizer will reach its performance limits, whereas the
learning mechanisms do not lack scalability and even perform better with an increasing
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number of agents.
A mixed model is OVID (Optimized Variation-Imitation-Decision) [Bre96] [MTE03].
The OVID model presents an option of combining the advantages of the genetic algorithm
STDEA, the numeric optimization procedure of the simplex method and the imitating and
directed exploring behavior of human cognitive processes. This algorithm does not de-
pend on a constant information flow between the agents, but can meaningfully optimize
its own behavior at any time. It is thus more robust than STDEA and yields better results
than pure numerical optimization approaches. The OVID model is currently only evalu-
ated in a test bed. There are no results using this algorithm in real application. Therefore,
it is considered to be a risk for the project using this model for learning. In CATNETS the
use of the STDEA algorithm is recommended, which has proved to be able to handle an
elevated number of agents in simulation and prototype.
3.2.3 Summary of Related Work
Summarizing the related work results in two concrete recommendations for the central-
ized and decentralized implementation of the Service Market:
The central mechanism for the Service Market will be a (continuous) double auction
as it fits the requirements defined in section 3.1.2. The decentralized mechanism will
comprise a bargaining concept on base of heuristic adaptive strategies and the STDEA
algorithm.
3.3 Design of the Service Market
Application Layer Networks (ALN) encompass heterogeneous resources by a high num-
ber of geographically distributed devices and administrative domains, which are logically
coupled together for providing processes on application level. This comprises compu-
tational services, data services and mixtures of these services. We expect ALNs to be
shaped by lots of basic services that can be dynamically combined to value-added com-
plex services (like in Service-oriented architectures [SH05]. The orchestration and cus-
tomization of these basic services can be understood as an inherent service, that must be
accomplished by the network as well, due to the complexity and the expertise require-
ments which must be hidden from the application. Basic services thus offer the interface
accessing computational resources for complex services, while hiding the orchestration
and implementation details.
In Service-oriented computing, users define complex business job requirements,
which are then broken up into collections or sequences of basic services that together
provide the desired functionality. The market participants, complex service as a buyer
and basic service as a seller, have various objectives, tasks, strategies and demand pat-
terns, which might change dynamically and unpredicted during life time.
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Traditional approaches, using centralized policies require complete state information
which is not available in dynamic and complex networks [KBM02]. As an acceptable
system-wide performance matrix is impossible to define, we use an economics-based
paradigm derived from human economies for the management or resource allocation and
orchestration.
These models are based on exchanging and acting on price signals. The participants
work for their own utility; thus, they evaluate the signals received and act according to
some utility function, which predicts an utility increase out of the effect of that action.
On a system-wide scale, a bird’s eye view on such market dynamics shows continuous
matching of demand and supply, a case of emergent coordination.
This section will provide a detailed presentation of the market models on the service
market. Basic design issues like bidding language and message specification, which are
the same on both mechanisms, are defined in subsection 3.3.1. The centralized market
mechanisms are specified in subsection 3.3.2 and section 3.3.3 presents the decentralized
market.
3.3.1 Bidding Language and Message Specification
A bidding language specifies, how agents have to submit their bids and, thus, which mes-
sages the agents exchange. For the service market, the bidding language can be formalized
as follows:
Let   be a set of   buyers (complex services) and  be a set of  sellers (ba-
sic services), where     defines an arbitrary buyer and    an arbitrary seller.
Furthermore, there is a set of  discrete services    
 
     
 
 with 

 .
A buyer  can express the valuation for a service 

by 	



  , i.e. the maximum
price for which the buyer  is willing to trade. The reservation price of a seller for allo-
cating a service 

is denoted by 




  
7, which represents the minimum price for
which the seller  is willing to trade.
Subsequently, the order 



 of a buyer  for a service 

can be represented as:




   	



 (3.1)
and the order 



 of a seller  is formalized as




   




 (3.2)
For instance, a complex service  wants to buy a PDF service 

   and
values this service with 	

    . The formalized order of the buyer  is represented
as


    
7It is also possible to mark seller orders by a negative sign.
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A counterpart for the buyer   could be a basic service  offering a PDF service 
 
 
  with a reservation price of 

    . This is formalized as


     	
For the implementation of the service market and the resource market, the service
level agreement language WS-Agreement will be used. WS-Agreement is a specification
defined within the Global Grid Forum (GGF). It defines a language and a protocol for
advertising the capabilities of service providers (in our case of basic services) and cre-
ating agreements based on creational offers, and for monitoring agreement compliance
at runtime [ACD 05]. The use of WS-Agreement is in line with the developments and
specifications done in WP 3 (Proof-of-Concept).
The presented bidding language for the service market is a small subset of WS-
Agreement and can be mapped to it. The mapping from an existing WS-Agreement to
the bidding language is, however, not possible as some parts of the WS-Agreement spec-
ifications are not used in the service market.
The following XML encoded document depicts a WS-Agreement encoded offer for
the above described offer for a PDF service:
<wsag:AgreementOffer>
<wsag:Name>
Offer
</wsag:Name>
<wsag:AgreementContext>
CATNETS
</wsag:AgreementContext>
<wsag:Terms>
<wsag:All>
<wsag:ServiceDescriptionTerm wsag:Name="exceutable"
wsag:ServiceName="PDFService">
<job:arguments>/some/file/to/convert</job:arguments>
</wsag:ServiceDescriptionTerm>
<wsag:GuaranteeTerm wsag:Name="ReservationPrice">
<wsag:ServiceScope>
<wsag:ServiceName>PDFService</wsag:ServiceName>
</wsag:ServiceScope>
<wsag:BusinessValueList>
<wsag:CustomBusinessValue>
<catnets:reservation>3</catnets:reservation>
</wsag:CustomBusinessValue>
</wsag:BusinessValueList>
</wsag:GuaranteeTerm>
</wsag:All>
</wsag:Terms>
</wsag:AgreementOffer>
The valuation and reservation prices are not part of the standard WS-Agreement spec-
ification. WS-Agreement permits, however, the extension of the specification via domain
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specific schemas. Thus, the prices are included as as domain specific schemas as a subset
of the CustomBusinessValue tag using a separate XML-schema.
3.3.2 Centralized Market
As discussed in section 3.2.1, a double auction institution fits the specified requirements.
In the following, the basic design principles of a double auction institution for the CAT-
NETS service market will be sketched.
Double Auction Market
In a double auction market, a large number of participants trade a common object and can
submit bids (buy orders) and asks (sell orders). Trading in double auctions is organized by
means of order books, each for a set of homogenous goods. An order book is responsible
for storing non executed orders of the agents. For instance, in the CATNETS scenario
there will be   different order books, each for one of the   different services.
Figure 3.3 depicts the high level architecture of the service market for CATNETS.
Complex services can submit buy orders to the order books; basic services can submit
sell orders. Each set of homogeneous services (e.g. PDF creator services) is traded in a
single order book.
Complex
Service
Basic
Service
Complex
Service
Basic
Service
Basic
Service
Complex
Service
Service Market
Orderbook 1 Orderbook n
[…]
Buy-Orders
[…]
Sell-Orders
[…]
Buy-Orders
[…]
Sell-Orders
[…]
Figure 3.3: The service market including several double auction order books.
Winner Determination and Pricing
Buyers and sellers in the double auction submit their bids in a sealed envelope to the
auctioneer. The auctioneer aggregates the bids to form supply and demand curves. This is
done by calculating the number of participants who want to buy or sell at a specific price.
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Suppose there are   buyers with bids for      and  buyers with bids for     .
Aggregating these demands results into a curve expressing that there are  buyers who
want to buy for      and  buyers who want to buy for      .
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quantity
Figure 3.4: Demand and supply curves in a double auction.
Once these curves are aggregated, they are used to set a specific price for trading
– the price at which supply equals demand in this case. Figure 3.4 shows exemplarily
aggregated supply and demand curves for a specific service 
 
. For instance, 10 of the
buyer orders want to buy the service 
 
for a price which is less or equal than  
 
  	
.
Now suppose the demand and supply curves given in figure 3.5. In this case, there is
a price tunnel between 18 and 20. Any price within this range will be acceptable because
the supply and demand curves overlap.
This overlap is resolved using the -pricing schema. The parameter  sets the fraction
of the profit that goes to the buyers and the sellers [PMN05]. Having a parameter   
 
given, a market clearing price     is chosen from the interval   confining
the range of all possible market clearing prices. The interval denotes the price tunnel. In
this case, the interval is given with    and   
.
Usually, a balanced order book is assumed, i.e. the number of buyers equals the
number of sellers. Therefore, in literature  is set to   
 as it privileges neither the
buyers’ side nor the sellers’ side [Fri91]. Thus, for the CATNETS application,  is also
initially set to   
8.
8It may be adapted during the simulation of the market by a configuration file.
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Figure 3.5: Demand and supply curves in a double auction with a price tunnel.
Order Types
In literature, a variety of order types for double auctions can be found [FSSW02]. For
instance, order types implementing basic logical constraints to allow traders to control the
price or the timing of their bids. Moreover, there exist special order types including more
intelligent logical constraints to adjust price dynamics in electronic markets [KM05].
The two most common order types are the limit order and the market order [Nab96].
The limit order with a price       indicates, that a participant wants to buy for at most
      or that a seller wants to sell for at least the price      . Furthermore, if
a trader submits an order for a service at the prevailing price, the order is called market
order (best execution).
In order to comply with the agent strategies of the decentralized market, the service
market will only consider limit orders, i.e. a direct bid of the valuation of an agent.
Continuous and Periodic Trading
A key consideration in double auctions is the timing of the clearing process, i.e. the timing
of determining the auction winners and thereby the allocation of the resources. Double
auctions can be either cleared continuously (Continuous Double Auction) or periodically
(Periodic Double Auction, Call Market):
A Continuous Double Auction (CDA) is a double auction where buyers and sellers
simultaneously and asynchronously announce bids and offers. Whenever a new order
enters the market, the auctioneer tries to clear the market immediately. Thus, the CDA is
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advantageous especially in terms of immediacy.
A Call Market is a double auction with periodic uniform clearing, e.g. the auctioneer
clears the market every fives minutes. All orders in a period are collected in an order book
and will be cleared periodically. Assuming none time-critical resources, the call market
is advantageous in terms of enhancing the overall welfare in a market.
To meet the requirements specified in section 3.1.2, both, the continuous double auc-
tion and the call market with a short time period fulfill the simultaneous trading of multiple
participants, an immediate service allocation, as well as avoiding partial executions.
A short time period may increase the overall welfare of a market; considering the
immediate service allocation, a continuous clearing would be superior. As both clearing
concepts can be easily implemented into a software system, the final decision concerning
the clearing of the market will be made during the simulation runs9.
Implementation
There exist several open source implementations of the  -double auction implementing
a CDA and a call market which can be used for the CATNETS project. For instance,
JASA10 (Java Auction Simulator API) implements various variants of the double-auction
as well as components for experiments, agents and learning algorithms. JASA is designed
to be light-weight and high-performance. The double auction implementation makes use
of the scalable 4-heap algorithm presented in [WWW98].
Another interesting implementation of a double auction is done within the Meet2Trade
platform11. Meet2Trade offers several components for a generic auction design and order
book management. Figure 3.6 shows exemplarily the order book of a Meet2Trade double
auction market.
Figure 3.6: Meet2Trade order book.
The market mechanism for the service market will implemented as a reusable compo-
9This can be simple achieved by a configuration setting.
10See http://www.csc.liv.ac.uk/˜sphelps/jasa/ for details (accessed: 09.10.2005)
11See http://www.meet2trade.org/ for details (accessed: 09.10.2005).
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nent for the simulation environment. As such, the decision whether to adapt JASA or the
double auction implementation of Meet2Trade will be made during the integration of the
auction into the simulator.
3.3.3 Decentralized Market
The market in the decentralized approach is mainly a communication bus where self-
interested agents barter for standardized basic services (see section 3.2.2 for the economic
background and related work). Compared to the centralized market approach using an
auctioneer, we do not have the possibility to send the bids to a central instance. Therefore,
we need to process a search at first, that sends the demand of a complex service to possible
basic service entities. In a second step, the bargaining between one complex service
(buyer) and basic service (seller) follows which determines the price for the good.
The requirements for the search at the service market are quite simple. The search
mechanism has to search only for the specified service type. No additional constraints
have to be taken into account. The selection of the search algorithm depends on the com-
putational efficiency regarding the required network bandwidth and optional reorganiza-
tion steps needed to adapt the changing environment. Therefore, we can use any existing,
widely accepted search methods like flooding or DHTs.
The CATNETS market
After the search for services, the selection process of a basic service is performed. Com-
pared to the centralized market, this selection process fundamentally differs. The global
order books of the centralized matchmaker become local order books of each complex
service which covers all offers of one basic service demand. If a complex service requests
a sequence of basic services, a complex service has an order book for each basic service
demand. Figure 3.7 shows the local order books of several complex services.
A local order book collects the bids of the basic services and puts them into an order,
beginning with the cheapest price. As described in the centralized market, the standard-
ized basic services don’t change over time. Only the price differentiates the basic service
of one specific type. This leads to a single attributive negotiation on the service market.
The change from a global order book (centralized approach) to local order books of
every complex service (decentralized approach) changes also the supply-demand curves.
In the decentralized market we only have a supply curve, because many suppliers (basic
services) submit bids for one demand. A possible supply curve shows figure 3.8. The
reservation price represents the upper price limit of a buyer.
At the end of the search step we have a list of possible basic service suppliers, which
can be incomplete. We assume, that the supply is ”good enough” for the following se-
lection process. A complete list of all possible suppliers is hard to realize, because the
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Figure 3.7: The service market including several complex service order books.
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Figure 3.8: Supply curve in a bilateral negotiation.
CHAPTER 3. SPECIFICATIONS OF THE SERVICE MARKET 43
assumed dynamic behavior changes the state of the system often and the costs for a com-
plete list become too high.
Bargaining and Pricing
Starting point for the winner determination through bartering is the cheapest basic service
offer. The complex service selects the cheapest bid and starts the bargaining with the
selected basic service provider. The definition of a strategy for winner determination
through bartering is essential in the decentralized CATNETS market. The initial situation
is described like depicted in figure 3.9. A (human) principal defines an indifference price
that equals his estimation about the value of the good. For a buyer, this is a maximum
price, for the seller a minimum price. So, the utility gain equals the amount between price
of the purchase and the indifference price. The start price represents the price where the
strategy begins to negotiate. By agreeing concessions, the opponents come closer to the
middle and a possible contract. A transaction is unlikely, if the closure zone is empty,
which might result when indifference prices do not build an overlapping zone.
10 20 30 40 50 60
Buyer
price
Seller
Start price
Start price
Price of Purchase
Closure zone
Indifferent price
(limit price)
Indifferent price
(limit price)
Figure 3.9: Bilateral negotiation process.
The goal of the software agent strategies is maximization of their own utility. For a
buyer, this means an maximization of the distance between the indifference and purchase
price and for the seller the enlargement of the interval between the seller’s purchase price
and his indifference price. The proposed realization for the CATNETS market is the usage
of a heuristic factor, that decides on the percentage change of the negotiation’s starting
price in the following, successful completed transactions. The higher this parameter is, the
lager is the aspiration towards the enlargement of price distances (a detailed explanation
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presents the next subsection). The agent is not aware of his reached level and there is no
optimal goal. The attempt to maximize his own utility is not limited by any restriction
regarding the absolute value nor time constraints and is a never ending process.
The continuous aspiration, to be better than other agents, is also influenced by the
selected learning algorithm. The search for a good parameter configuration which assures
good utility gain, leads to comparison with and re-combination of known configurations
of other agents. This results in the decentralized, evolutionary learning algorithm STDEA
[SNT98].
Negotiation protocol
The negotiation protocol for the CATNETS project defines the interaction schema be-
tween the negotiating parties. This is a sequential process of exchanging communicative
acts. If there is complete market information like in the centralized market, the nego-
tiation protocol is short and quite simple. In the decentralized market model, the point
of complete information is never reached; both agents converge to a tradeoff point in an
iterative way using the exchange of offers and counter-offers. Rosenschein and Zlotkin
([RZ94]) call this a monotonic concession protocol.
The negotiation protocol messages are sent between the agents in a bilateral way.
Figure 3.10 shows the bargaining protocol on the service market. The negotiation process
on the decentralized CATNETS market is divided into different phases. The first part
of the negotiation is the request for a specific basic service. As we described above,
the buyer (complex service) specifies his demand and the seller (basic service) creates a
proposal for this demand. The second phase is the selection of one basic service with
which the negotiation continues. Afterwards, in the third step, both bargain until they
reach an agreement or possibly fail. In the final phase of the negotiation protocol, the
agents confirm their negotiation outcome.
Complex Service Basic Service
request
propose
propose / reject / cancel
propose / reject / cancel
accept
confirm
order
Figure 3.10: The bargaining protocol on the service market.
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b
d
a
c
propose
reject/cancel
accept
…
…
…
Figure 3.11: The states of the negotiation protocol.
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The negotiation protocol has different states, where decision about the next commu-
nicative act has to be made. If the negotiation protocol is in state a (see figure 3.11), the
strategy has three possible decision options: accept the offer, propose a counter-offer or
reject the offer. A detailed description of the decision-making process presents the next
subsection.
Compared to the centralized communication protocol, where there are two types of
message, bid and ask, the decentralized bargaining protocol needs five different message
types: request, propose, accept, reject and confirm. The semantic meaning of the message
payload is described using the proposed bidding language (see section 3.3.1).
The decentralized market model combines the protocol, the heuristic strategy and the
the learning algorithm to specify a market-based control mechanism for resource alloca-
tion in complex and dynamic systems. The next section gives an overview, what now have
the proposed concepts impact to the other work packages which use and evaluate these
concepts.
Negotiation strategy
The negotiation strategy is used to reach the utility goal. The strategy specifies the actions,
an agent uses for attainability of his goals. He chooses the best alternative action for his
goal on the basis of information about the environment. The negotiation strategy, which
is described here, is based on the AVALANCHE strategy [Eym00]. The strategy defines
5 basic parameters: acquisitiveness, priceStep, priceNext, satisfaction, weightMemory.
These are used in the bargaining strategy and are explained in the following section.
Additionally the message format of the strategy component is defined with 5 parameters:
Factory-ID The Factory-ID specifies the negotiated good, which is on the CATNETS
service market the standardized basic service.
Proposal type to generate The second parameter defines the type of proposal to gener-
ate. This can be either a bid or an ask. This distinction is important on the one hand
to rate the level of the own bid in ratio to the market price and on the other hand to
determine the direction in which a concession can be made.
Opponent’s current price, My old price These two values define the price signalling,
which have to be related to each other. The ”Opponent’s current price” is the sig-
nalled price of the negotiation partner, which represents his current offer. ”My old
price” is the last price sent to the negotiation partner, which is the base value for
making concession.
Conversation-ID The parameter ”Conversation-ID” is mainly a technical parameter
which is used to identify the negotiation, when simultaneous negotiations are run-
ning. At the CATNETS service market, this parameter is not important, because for
simplicity we have not implemented simultaneous negotiations.
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Current market price The current market price of the negotiated good is needed to
evaluate the transferred prices of the negotiation partner. The price is signalled using
a price distribution. If the price distribution is not defined yet, like at the beginning of
the negotiation, a new price distribution is set. After the initialization of strategy three
non-null values exist: the own price, the opponent’s price and the market price. In the
following we distinguish between the first-time generation of the offer price and the suc-
ceeding negotiation steps. The difference is, that there is no value of a former offer at the
initial negotiation step.
First-time generation of an offer If the negotiation just started, an agent can use only
two of the the three possible clues: the bargaining price of the opponent which he receives
with the demand and the subjective market price. He can use only these prices to generate
the first counter-offer. A buyer-bid is generated like this:
if (proposalTypeToGenerate == Proposal.ASK) {
currentPriceDistribution.setInitialPrice(
currentPriceDistribution.
getLastAgreementPrice() *
(1 - myGenotype.getPriceNext()),
proposalTypeToGenerate);
currentPriceDistribution.setLimitPrice(
currentPriceDistribution.
getWeightedAverage(),
proposalTypeToGenerate);
These code lines define the closure zone of the bargaining. The initial price – this is
the starting price of the negotiation – is computed using the last price, a successful for-
mer negotiation, that has ended (lastAgreementPrice), less a winner price gain (myGeno-
type.priceNext).
Adaptation of the initial and limit prices The parameter myGenotype.priceNext mod-
ifies the particular starting value of a new negotiation. The result of the last negotiation is
saved and it is esteemed as quite sure, to achieve the almost the same value as in the last
negotiation. An achievement of the last would not increase the utility of the agent. There-
fore, he tries to buy cheaper the next time and decreases his initial price with a winner
discount. The multiplication with myGenotype.priceNext computes the starting price for
the next transaction.
It is assumed that an agent is never satisfied with an achieved goal and wants to achieve
a higher outcome at the next negotiation. Either he decreases his concession rate, or he
begins with a higher starting value (as a seller) so, that he reaches a higher outcome with
the same concession rate. Like humans adapt their behavior to new situations, an agent is
CHAPTER 3. SPECIFICATIONS OF THE SERVICE MARKET 48
able to change these parameters using an evolutionary learning algorithm . Calculational,
this proceeding increases the starting price of the seller (computed as the sum of indif-
ference price and the desired utility increase) and decreases the starting bid of the buyer
(computed as the indifference price less desired utility increase) respectively.
An example for priceNext=0.15: A buyer agent bought a good for 100 the last
time. Using his last outcome and priceNext parameter, he will start the following transac-
tion with 85. Now, the question about how to choose the limit price arises. In the present
case, the average of the known market price (currentPriceDistribution.weightedAverage)
is used. Another option can be, that the first seller offer is reversed. Here, the initial
price is the last closure price increased with a winner bonus. Using this price, the seller
decreases his price in the negotiation step by step until he reaches his limit price:
} else {
//proposalTypeToGenerate == Proposal.BID
currentPriceDistribution.setInitialPrice(
currentPriceDistribution.getLastAgreementPrice() *
(1 + myGenotype.getPriceNext()),proposalTypeToGenerate);
currentPriceDistribution.setLimitPrice(
currentPriceDistribution.getWeightedAverage(),
proposalTypeToGenerate);
}
After the agent has defined the closure zone, it must be checked, whether the ex-
changed bid of the opponent is in the closure zone already and a negotiation needn’t be
started. In this case, there is no negotiation object needed and the offer price can be
accepted immediately.
if ((proposalTypeToGenerate == Proposal.ASK) &&
(opponentsCurrentPrice <= myNewPrice)) {
// I am buyer, so if initial offer
// from opponent is already lower
// than I am willing to buy at, accept
recommendedAction = ACCEPT;
this.executionState =
"ask was underbid on first round";
myNewPrice = opponentsCurrentPrice
} else if (
(proposalTypeToGenerate == Proposal.BID) &&
(opponentsCurrentPrice >= myNewPrice)) {
// I am seller, opponent is buyer,
// and he buys for more than I want to get
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recommendedAction = ACCEPT;
this.executionState =
"bid was overasked on first round";
myNewPrice = opponentsCurrentPrice
}
This was the last step of the first negotiation round. The next paragraph describes the
handling of the negotiation history.
Storage of the negotiation’s executions state The negotiation history is stored in an
object, to save the last communicative act. In the parameter history.priceStep the level
of the possible concession for the following negotiation is computed and stored using
the initial prices of the negotiation partners. A precentral computation of the concession
level out of the current prices leads to a infinite convergence to a concession price without
reaching this price exactly. We assume in the following, that a negotiation data-set exists
and the own and the last opponent’s bid is known.
Adaptation of the market price using signalled price information The first part of
the strategy is the adaption of the subjective market price for the negotiable good using
signalled price information. How the price information are used to create a market price,
every agent has to decide on himself, because there is no central information store like
a database or an auctioneer. Every price information, which is signalled to an agent, is
associated with exponential first order smoothing of the existing price information and
stored in the current price distribution (market price) object. The weighted mean value of
the method ”getWeightedAverage()” states the current estimation of this market price.
The rating of the offer due to a subjective market price through an agent is absolutely
needed for the operativeness of the strategy. If such a rating is not done, the agent starts
at every bid a negotiation and tries to finish this negotiation. Therefore, this opens the
floodgates to speculative bids. An example:
Anna can ask 1000 for a good, Benno’s price of the good is 10. They negotiate
until they close an agreement at about 505. If the market price of the good is 900,
Benno bought the good very cheap. If the real market price is at 20, Anna’s bid was
profiteering. This cannot be taken as granted; it is very likely, that one of the agents has
signalled knowingly wrong information. Only the knowledge of the real market price can
prevent, that one of the two agents is discriminated.
This consideration is based on the presence of common value goods: The market
price measures the price of the good, because it can be sold infinite times, in principle
[San96]. The more information an agents gets about different prices, the better is his
market picture and the better is he able to arrange out if it his own pricing (or the rating
of the others pricing).
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Protection against usury bids The buyer checks the initial signalled price before he
starts a negotiation, whether this price is in an interval which can lead to a successful
negotiation result. He compares the signalled price with price bids from proceeding ne-
gotiations with other agents. This is independent from a successful result of these negoti-
ations with other agents. In particular, he is able to reject usury bids at the beginning. In
CATNETS, bids which are higher than double market price are rejected immediately.
weightMemory The weighting ratio of current price information and historic price in-
formation influences the strategy of the agents largely. The higher the weighting factor
(implemented as myGenotype.weightMemory) is, the faster the market price adapts to the
current market situation. But, the agents can be influenced faster through short-time price
fluctuation on the market. This will emphasize the characteristic behavior of the agent.
A ”correct” value of the weighting factor cannot be defined a priori. The value arises
from the cooperation of the agents. The parameter weightMemory is predefined at the
initialization of the agent. It influences the learning in the following way:
if (opponentsCurrentPrice > 0) {
currentPriceDistribution.addValue(
opponentsCurrentPrice,
myGenotype.getWeightMemory());
this.executionState = "updated streetPrice = " +
currentPriceDistribution.getWeightedAverage();
}
Check about the obtainment of a tradeoff price The next step is the determination,
whether the opponent signalled a acceptable bid. It is checked similar to the direct accep-
tance of a bid in the first round as described above. The current bid is compared about
intersection with the own last price (myOldPrice).
if ((proposalTypeToGenerate == Proposal.ASK) &&
(opponentsCurrentPrice <= myOldPrice)) {
// I am buyer, opponent is seller,
// and he sells for less than I would pay
recommendedAction = ACCEPT;
this.executionState = "ask was underbid";
double myNewPrice = opponentsCurrentPrice
currentNegotiationHistory.setMyLastPrice(
myNewPrice);
currentNegotiationHistory.setOpponentsLastPrice(
opponentsCurrentPrice);
currentPriceDistribution.setLastAgreementPrice(
myNewPrice);
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historyHash.put(conversationID,
currentNegotiationHistory);
priceHash.put(factorID, currentPriceDistribution);
return myNewPrice;
}
If there is a intersection, the bid is accepted and the status is updated. The negotiation
history is also updated (currentNegotiationHistory). The currentPriceDistribution-object,
that contains the market price, stores information about future concession rates in the
lastAgreementPrice parameter. The process for acceptance is laterally reversed and thus
is not described here in detail.
Abort of the negotiation due to dissatisfaction with the previous development If
the last negotiation steps didn’t reach a result, we are in the middle of a negotiation and
know our own bid and the opponent’s bid. The next step estimates, if it makes sense to
continue the negotiation and if there is a chance to come to an agreement. First check is,
whether the opponent signalled a usury bid which is higher than 100% over the current
estimated market price. Continuing this negotiation would have less promise on success
and the stored market price in the following negotiation rounds distort. Therefore, the bid
is rejected.
double upperBound =
currentPriceDistribution.getWeightedAverage() *
ACCEPTABLE_SPREAD;
double lowerBound =
currentPriceDistribution.getWeightedAverage() /
ACCEPTABLE_SPREAD;
if ((opponentsCurrentPrice >= upperBound)
|| (opponentsCurrentPrice <= lowerBound)) {
// unconditional constraint: usury;
// opponent’s price is 100% off the street price
recommendedAction = REJECT;
this.executionState = "rejected: usury";
myNewPrice = opponentsCurrentPrice;
currentNegotiationHistory.setMyLastPrice(
myNewPrice);
currentNegotiationHistory.
setOpponentsLastPrice(
opponentsCurrentPrice);
historyHash.put(negotiationID,
currentNegotiationHistory);
priceHash.put(factorID,
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currentPriceDistribution);
return myNewPrice;
}
The next paragraphs show the strategy of evaluating offers using the parameters sat-
isfaction and acquisitiveness. 3.12 gives a schematic overview of this process. First, it
is checked whether the former offer was better or not. In a second step the parameter
satisfaction and in a third step the parameter acquisitiveness is evaluated.
negotiation
reject further
draw random number
0 <= r <= 1
draw random number
0 <= r <= 1
receive offer
value of delta_change
according to the
adapt offer try former 
offer again
send offer back
r > satisfaction r <= satisfaction
offer is better
offer is not better
than former one
than former one
r < acquisitiveness r >= aquisitiveness
Figure 3.12: The evaluation process for received offers.
Satisfaction If the offer price is higher than the market price, but less than double mar-
ket price, an agent has to decide whether to continue. It is possible that the market price
of the negotiated good increased his price. To simulate a more complex deterministic
”probe”, the stochastic factor myGenotype.satisfaction is checked which has values be-
tween 0 and 1. A satisfaction value of 0.75 means, that the agent is satisfied to 75% with
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the negotiation process and continues. An agent with satisfaction 0 will abort a negotia-
tion at once and an agent with satisfaction 1 will never abort a negotiation.
Commitment to concessions Third, the agent checks if the opponent has made an con-
cession. If the negotiation rounds do not satisfy the agent (i.e. The negotiation partner
didn’t change the price compared to the last round and therefor shows a competitive be-
havior), a stochastic check against the satisfaction parameter about aborting the negotia-
tion is done (i.e. a reject instead of a counter-offer is sent):
if (RND.simulate() >
myGenotype.getSatisfaction()) {
recommendedAction = REJECT;
this.executionState =
"rejected because of dissatisfaction";
myNewPrice = opponentsCurrentPrice;
Both, the buyer and the seller agent, can abort a negotiation at every round – the
shorter the negotiation, the higher is the chance for a successful transaction. A simple
statistical computation shows, that the chance of a successful negotiation decreases with
the negotiation time. Making concessions only makes sense in combination of the time
pressure.
Decision about making concessions – the parameter acquisitiveness The parameter
Genotype.acquisitiveness defines the probability to make an uniliteral concession in the
following negotiation. The real decision is determined with a stochastic ”probe”. The
value of the parameter does not determine the action, but sets a specific probability. The
value interval is between 0 and 1. A value of 0.7 means a probability of 70%, that an
agent follows a competitive strategy not making concessions. A seller agent with a true
boolean value will not adapt his price and will signal the same price to his opponent.
// third strategy component:
// will we make a concession
this.executionState =
"positively calculating concession";
double concessiveness = RND.simulate();
if (concessiveness <
myGenotype.getAcquisitiveness()) {
//no concession, repeat our last proposal
recommendedAction = PROPOSE;
this.executionState =
"no concession, repeat price";
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If the boolean value is false, the agent computes an new price, adapting the price using
his concession parameter. A buyer agent will rise his offer, a seller agent will lower his
price. An agent with acquisitiveness value 1 will never change his price and an agent with
acquisitiveness value 0 will make an unilateral concession, adapting his price towards the
opponents price.
Decision about the concession’s level – the parameter priceStep The concession’s
level (priceStep) is defined at the beginning of the negotiation with the parameter Geno-
type.priceStep during the initialization of the negotiation history:
history.setPriceStep(
Math.abs(opponentsCurrentPrice - myNewPrice) *
myGenotype.getPriceStep());
The definition of an absolute concession level does not take into account the level of
the demanded price which leads to an implementation with a percentage computation.
The direct indication of the concession as a percentage of the bid discriminates the seller,
because he assumes an absolute value during the negotiation. The following example
points up this problem:
Anne would like to sell her good for 80, Benno offers only 60. If both, Anna and
Benno, decide on a 20% concession, Anna submits a bid with 16 less in the next round
and Benno submits a bid with only 12 higher. The average between the crossing bids of
64 (Anna) and 72 (Benno) is 68. The difference from the starting utility is for Anna
12 and for Benno only 8. The utility gain is therefore not symmetric. Only Benno will
benefit under the assumption that the same prices mean identical utility change.
With such a process, the market price decreases over time. That would lead to a
wrong picture of the market-based coordination mechanism. Thus, a percentage of the
difference between the initial starting prices of both parties is introduced in the strategy
which does not change during the negotiation. A value of Genotype.priceStep = 0.25
means a computation of the concession level as 1/4 of the first stated difference. If both
opponents negotiate in the same way and make concession to each other, they meet each
other on the half way in the third negotiation round under the assumption of no negotiation
abortion. An example for explanation:
Anna submits 80 as her first offer, Benno offers 60. The difference between the two
offers is 20. Both negotiation partner have priceStep = 0.25. The concession level is 20
* 0.25 = 4 for each negotiation partner. In the second negotiation round, both decide on
concession; Anna offers now 75 and Benno 65. In the third round again, both decide
on concession and they meet at 70.
The computation of the concession’s value for a buyer is presented below. He in-
creases his demand price and makes a concession for a seller. The limit price is the
buyer’s upper bound:
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recommendedAction = PROPOSE;
double delta\_price =
currentNegotiationHistory.getPriceStep();
if (proposalTypeToGenerate == Proposal.ASK) {
double myNewPrice =
Math.min(
currentPriceDistribution.
getUpperLimitPrice(),
myOldPrice + delta\_price);
The seller follows the same process respectively. If no other condition is fulfilled, the
last offer is submitted again:
this.executionState =
"no condition applied, repeat last price";
double myNewPrice =
currentNegotiationHistory.getMyLastPrice();
This heuristic strategy is used to realize market-based control on the decentralized
CATNETS market. The strategy is supported using the Smith Taylor Distributed Evolu-
tionary learning Algorithm (STDEA) for faster adoption to the dynamic environment. In
section 3.2.2 we gave an overview of possible learning algorithms. We chose the STDEA
algorithm, because there were good results in the former CatNet project with this learning
component. The following paragraph will give short introduction the basic setting of the
STDEA.
Learning using STDEA The learning algorithm in CATNETS is necessary for the
adoption of the strategy to the changing environment. It is assumed, that the parame-
ters which define the strategy can be stored in an object. The learning algorithms receives
this object with the current parameters as input and returns the new parameters which can
be used in the strategy. Important methods of the learning interface are:
• getRecommendedLearningAction(): This method gives feedback to the strategy
about what to do with the learning information. Two options are possible in CAT-
NETS: Either ignore the learning information or substitute the existing strategy
values with the new ones.
• getGeneration(): getGeneration() provides a counter for a successful learning pro-
cess. This counts the generations of the evolutionary algorithm.
• createFitnessInformation(): This creates the fitness information for learning ac-
tions.
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The basic concepts of STDEA are already presented in the related work section. We
will describe here the algorithm in detail. The STDEA is an evolutionary algorithm. There
are three information entities in this algorithm which we separate in the following:
• Plumage: This entity is used for transportation of successful strategy parameter
combinations (genotypes).
• Gene: A gene describes one parameter of the strategy. Two different gene types are
possible: a boolean and a float gene.
• Genotype: A genotype subsumes the single genes to a strategy parameter set.
Specification of a gene and a genotype A gene represent one characteristic attribute of
an agent’s strategy. The gene has to provide some basic functionality which are derived
from genetic processes in biology:
• replicate: The replica method creates an identical copy of the original parameter
value.
• mutate: The mutation-method alters the current value of the parameter a small step.
If we have boolean gene, this process will negate the value. The float gene is always
a parameter between 0.0 and 1.0. We will use a creep mutation of the float gene
which means, that we adapt the parameter with small steps of maximal 0.01. This
prevents jumps of the parameter’s value.
The genotype is a set of genes. The genes of an agent represent in the CATNETS
project the strategy parameters. Therefore the agent has a set of 5 genes described at the
strategy section. The genes in CATNETS are: acquisitiveness, satisfaction, PriceStep,
PriceNext and weightMemory. An agent cannot change these values himself. They are
stored in a genotype-object which enables a change through mutation. The initialization
of a genotype is processed like the following:
public class Genotype extends Vector
implements IMutateable, IRandomizeable,
Cloneable, Serializable {
public Genotype(
double p_acquisitiveness,
double del_change,
double del_jump,
double p_satisfaction,
double w_memory,
double p_reputation) {
this.add(new FloatGene(p\_acquisitiveness));
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this.add(new FloatGene(del\_change));
this.add(new FloatGene(del\_jump));
this.add(new FloatGene(p\_satisfaction));
this.add(new FloatGene(w\_memory));
}
The whole vector is able to perform a mutation and crossover operation with another
genotype. A mutation changes every parameter with a probability of 5%; this changes the
bit at the boolean gene and slowly modifies the float value at the float gene.
public final void mutate(Random rand) {
for (Enumeration e = elements();
e.hasMoreElements(); ) {
Gene g = (Gene) e.nextElement();
if (rand.nextFloat() < 0.05) {
g.mutate(rand); }}}
Initialization of the genotype using a configuration file The CATNETS agents are
initialized with a random distribution of parameters which are stored in a configuration
file. The random distribution has fixed values for the mean value and variance on agent
population level. During the setup the agents are initialized using these values. This
enables a heterogeneous distribution of bargaining strategies and an individual genotype
of every agent.
<strategy>
<acquisitiveness>
<average>0.60</average>
<variance>0.0</variance>
</acquisitiveness>
<price\_step>
<average>0.35</average>
<variance>0.0</variance>
</price\_step>
<price\_next>
<average>0.20</average>
<variance>0.0</variance>
</price\_next>
<satisfaction>
<average>0.50</average>
<variance>0.0</variance>
</satisfaction>
<weight_memory>
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<average>0.50</average>
<variance>0.0</variance>
</weight_memory>
</strategy>
The distribution function interprets a variance of 0 as taking the mean value every
time. A variance of 0.2 with a mean value of 0.5 leads to an interval from 0.3 to 0.8 for
the concrete value assuming a equal distribution.
Measurement and propagation of fitness information Learning and adoption demand
the declaration of a reference value almost at all times which should be achieved or ex-
ceeded. Information about the performance of other market participants is needed to learn
a successful market strategy. The performance has to be measurable as well as compara-
ble. In CATNETS we use the fitness information of an agent as a performance metric.
The fitness of every bargaining strategy results from the income level, that an agent ob-
tains from actions leading to successful transactions. This income is added to the agent’s
wealth. We assume, that every agent starts with the same wealth. This makes the income
increase of the agents comparable at discrete time levels. All buy and sell actions have
influence on his actual balance. An agent has to pay for his acquired goods on the one
hand and on the other hand he increases his balance with the sale of goods.
In CATNETS, the agents can use the market place for free. This means, the commu-
nication and computing costs do not influence the strategy. An ex-post analysis of these
costs is processed in the evaluation work package (see the deliverable of WP 4 for further
information). An agent whose capital is equal to zero, is removed from the market place.
In simulation this means, that the agent will be deleted, in the prototype this agent is sent
back to the owner’s agent pool. His strategy is not available any more. This concept
enables a consistent performance measurement in simulation and prototype.
Every agent creates after a successful transaction a plumage which contains his fitness
and his genotype. The fitness of an agent is the difference between the market price and
the subjective value of the traded good, i.e. the surplus achieved in the negotiation. The
plumage is transferred to a randomly selected agents.
double profit =
myCurrentProposal.getUnitPrice() -
strategy.getAveragePrice(factorID);
sendMessage(
new GroupMessage(
"inform", holdingID,
(Plumage)
strategy.getLearningModule().
createFitnessInformation(profit)));
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After an agent receives the inform message, he stores the plumage. The plumage
number in the storage is counted and compared against a threshold.
protected synchronized boolean
interpretInform(Message currentMessage) {
if (currentMessage.getContent()
instanceof Plumage) {
Plumage courterPlumage =
(Plumage) currentMessage.getContent();
strategy.getLearningModule()
addInformation(courterPlumage);
The learning algorithm of Smith and Taylor (1998) If an agent has received enough
plumage items, he chooses the genotype with the highest fitness and starts the learning
process performing crossover and mutation. The new genotype substitutes the old geno-
type. The learning is only started, if there are enough choices in form of plumage items.
if (strategy.getLearningModule().
getRecommendedAction() ==
ILearning.MATE) {
strategy.setMyGenotype(
(Genotype) strategy.getLearningModule().
learn(strategy.getMyGenotype()));
The parameter maturityThreshold is checked which prevents a too fast changing of
the strategy. This equals the sexual maturity in biology. If an agent is old enough, he is
allowed to distribute his genes with his genotype.
Smith98.learn() public Object learn(Object oldGenotype) {
if (maturity < maturityThreshold) {
return oldGenotype;
}
Plumage p = getMate();
if (p != null) {
Genotype g = learningOwner.getStrategy().
getMyGenotype().cross(p.getSenderGenes(),
new java.util.Random());
g.mutate(new java.util.Random());
return g;
}
// no partner found, repeat old genotype
synchronized (courterPlumages) {
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courterPlumages.clear();
}
return oldGenotype;
}
In the next step, the plumage with the highest fitness is selected. After selection of a
learning partner, both genotypes are recombined to a new genotype:
//crossover
public Genotype cross(Genotype geneOfFather,
Random Rand) {
FloatGene g;
Genotype ret = new Genotype();
if (size() != geneOfFather.size()) {
// genes of father and mother
// have different length");
}
Enumeration ep = elements();
Enumeration em = geneOfFather.elements();
while (ep.hasMoreElements()) {
FloatGene gp = (FloatGene) ep.nextElement();
FloatGene gm = (FloatGene) em.nextElement();
if (Rand.nextFloat() < 0.5) {
ret.add(
new FloatGene(gp.getDoubleValue()));
} else {
ret.add(
new FloatGene(gm.getDoubleValue()));
}
}
return ret;
}
The method cross() adds with a percentage of 50 either the mother or father gene to
the new genotype. The resulting child genotype has a combination of mother and father
genes at the end. The recombination phase is followed by the mutation phase. This
phase performs some changes at the child genotype (mutate()). This method closes the
adaptation. A garbage collection process resets the plumage-lists.
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3.4 Relations to other Work Packages
The conceptualization and definition of the centralized and decentralized market mecha-
nisms for the service market in this chapter relate strongly to the efforts in work package
2 (simulator), work package 3 (proof of concept) and work package 4 (evaluation).
Both, the simulator and the prototype have to support the provisioning of standardized
services. This must be carried out in a way, that sequences of basic services may be
requested. A common interface for the specification of services in the simulator as well
as the prototype would be very helpful. In the following these relations are elaborated in
more detail.
3.4.1 Relations to Simulator (WP2)
In the simulator work package (WP2) the main focus within the first 12 months of the
project duration was the selection of the appropriate simulation tool. The main desiderata
for the selection criteria is the compatibility of the simulation tool with the desired market
mechanisms.
On the one hand, the centralized service auctioneers and on the other hand, decen-
tralized – catallactic – market mechanisms must be covered by simulations. Therefore,
the centralized and the decentralized mechanisms developed throughout this chapter are
relevant to the selection of the appropriate simulator tool.
In the second year of the project, the interconnection between work package 1 and 2
will be even more emphasized than in the first year, when the developed market mecha-
nisms will be implemented in the simulator.
3.4.2 Relations to Proof of Concept (WP3)
Based on existing P2P architectures, the contribution of the outcomes of work package 1
to work package 3 is the definition of the relation between catallactic market mechanisms
and Grid/P2P systems. Here, the concepts of decentralized allocation mechanisms will be
taken into account when defining and implementing the prototype setup.
3.4.3 Relations to Evaluation (WP4)
There exists a fundamental relation between work package 1 and work package 4. The
main role of work package 4 in the project is to define and identify relevant metrics for
the measurement of economic and technical efficiency of the market mechanisms.
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These metrics will then be applied in order to evaluate the efficiency of the developed
centralized market mechanisms versus the quality of the decentralized – catallactic – mar-
ket mechanisms with respect to allocative efficiency, incentive efficiency, budget balance,
rationality, tractability, communication complexity, and technical efficiency. One of the
key goals will be to apply the efficiency measures to the data, obtained from simulations
and the prototype application.
Chapter 4
Specifications of the Resource Market
4.1 Environmental Analysis
Having defined the environment for trading the services, the corresponding market for
trading the resources has to be designed. The environment for designing a resource market
can be compared to the environments found in the Grid, Peer-to-Peer, and Distributed
Computing literature. These research areas – especially the research done in the area of
Computational Grids – build the base for the following analysis.
4.1.1 Environment Definition
The environment of the resource market mainly comprises basic services and resource
services:
Basic Service A basic service is a modular software application which needs a set of
resources for fulfilling its goals, i.e. for executing a specific application, that a
complex service requires.
Resource Service A resource service is a computing resource which encapsulates the
computation capabilities as a service.
Figure 4.1 outlines the resource market of the CATNETS scenario. Suppose a basic
service is part of the allocation in the service market with a PDF service. The basic
service now requires computer resources for executing the service (e.g. a computation
service capable providing 400 MIPS and 512 MB of memory and a storage service with
10 GB of free space). Thus, the basic service acts as a resource consumer on the resource
market and the so-called resource services as resource suppliers.
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Figure 4.1: Resource Market
Participants
The resource market – in analogy to Grid environments – consists of multiple buyers and
sellers. Basic services act as buyers and resource services as sellers.
In analogy to the service market, it is difficult to determine a realistic number of
participants in a market for trading computer resource. At the moment, there is no ex-
isting commercial market place for trading such resources. However, there exist several
test-beds and experimental evaluation studies which serve as clues. Table 4.1 lists exem-
plarily a selection of test-beds found in the Grid, Peer-to-Peer, and Distributed Computing
literature.
Name Resources Users Jobs/Day
Grid 2003 Project 700 102 1300
NorduGrid 1300
Conrell Center 512 512 800
San Diego 1152 468 250
PlanetLab 350 350
Table 4.1: Statistics of Grid and Peer-to-Peer test-beds.
Grid 2003 Project: The Grid2003 Project deploys a multi-virtual organization and
application-driven Grid laboratory. The project sustained the production-level ser-
vices for several months which were required by several different research institutes
(e.g. for physics experiment, gravitational wave search) [FGG 04]. In peak times,
the system handled 1300 jobs simultaneously.
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NorduGrid: The NorduGrid1 project provides a Grid infrastructure by adapting existing
Grid middleware components (e.g. Globus Toolkit). In peak times, the NorduGrid
handles about 1300 jobs per day.
Cornell Theory Center: The Cornell Theory Center is a high-performance computing
center which supports scientific and engineering research projects. The center has
over 500 CPUs and handles over 800 jobs per day2 in peak times.
San Diego Supercomputer: The San Diego Supercomputer Center hosts a cluster with
over 1100 processors. The average number of jobs executed per day was measured
with 250 [EHY02]. The workload of this center served also as a benchmark for
several scheduling architectures, e.g. the workload which is used in [EHY02].
PlanetLab: PlanetLab is a distributed overlay platform to support the deployment and
evaluation of planetary-scale network services [BBC 04b]. It includes over 350
machines located in over 20 different countries.
Besides several test-beds, there exist simulation settings for evaluating the perfor-
mance of different Grid components (e.g. scheduler, resource manager). For instance,
[IF01] use in their setting 10.000 resources, 5.000 different users, and 100 jobs per day.
[KDJN03] perform an evaluation with 500 different users. [RS04] use 6.000 different
resources for their simulation setting.
Similar to the analysis for the environment for the service market, the related systems
and simulation settings give a first impression of the number of participants and the num-
ber of jobs to model. Moreover, the number of participants in the resource market strongly
depends on the overall number of participants (i.e. complex services and basic services)
in the service market. Therefore, a detailed analysis has to be made in conjunction with
the service market environment as well as with the technical analysts in the CATNETS
project.
Transaction Objects
In the resource market, the transaction objects are computing resources like processors or
storage servers. Computing resources are non standardized capacity-type objects. Capac-
ity (e.g. processing power) not used in a time-period   is worthless at a later time-period
    . Furthermore, the same resources (e.g. CPUs) can differ in their capacities, e.g. a
computing engine can be a high-performance processor capable of processing billions of
1See http://www.nordugrid.org/ and http://grid.uio.no/atlas/nglogger/
nglogger_info/ for details (accessed: 10.02.2005).
2See http://www.cs.huji.ac.il/labs/parallel/workload/ for details (accessed
05.01.2005)
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MIPS3, as well as a low-performance processor of a mobile hand-held computer. There-
fore, computer resources can be described by a set of possible attributes and its character-
istics. For instance, a storage server can be characterized by its quality attributes capacity
(in Gigabyte (GB)), access time (in milliseconds (ms)), and data throughput (in bits per
second (bits/s)).
The set and the number of possible different transaction objects in the resource market
(e.g. resources like CPUs, hard-disks) are not specified in detail. Surveying the literature,
a common set of possible resources can be identified. [CS01] introduce a base set of re-
source types that have to be supported within a resource management mechanism: Com-
puter resources (CPU, GPU), storage resources (memory, disk, tape), network resources
(HPC switch, LAN, WAN), and miscellaneous resources (guest account, quota protocol).
[BM02] and [KC02] abstract to the following five resources: processor, memory, storage,
I/O, and network.
The specification of Open Service Grid Architecture (OGSA) as an open standard for
the interactions between different computing resources across organizational entities goes
one step further: OGSA defines computer and storage resources as well as networks, pro-
grams, databases, and the like as services, i.e. network enabled entities that provide some
capability. Conceiving any use of resources as service paves the path for interoperabil-
ity among heterogeneous computing and application environments [FNT02]. OGSA and
one of its reference implementations Globus Toolkit4 provide the technical infrastructure
for accessing computational services over the Grid. Computers equipped with a Globus
installation can easily access computational resources over the Grid, where the access
is in-transparent for the user. OGSA considers services which reflect resource function-
alities (e.g. storage) and quality characteristics (e.g. size), dependencies, and time at-
tributes. Relying on services instead of computational resources removes many technical
problems. For instance, the resource CPU may technically not be offered without some
amount of hard disk on the same computer, while a computation service offering CPU cy-
cles already includes the complementary resources. In the remainder of the deliverable, it
is abstracted from those technical details by treating resources and services as synonyms.
Concluding the discussion, the transaction objects are seen as services with multiple
attributes. For the concrete number of different services, the reader is referred to deliver-
able D2.1 (Simulation) [Zin05].
4.1.2 Requirement Analysis
Despite the classical mechanism design requirements pertaining to the mechanism as de-
scribed in section 3.1.2, the mechanism for the resource market must also account for the
underlying environment. For the resource market the requirements stemming from the
3MIPS stands for million instructions per second and is an approximate measure of a computer’s pro-
cessing speed.
4See http://www.globus.org/ for details.
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underlying environment are the following [SNW04, SNVW05a]:
Simultaneous trading and immediate resource allocation: In analogy to the service
market requirements, the market mechanism for the resource market has to support
the simultaneous trading of multiple buyers and sellers, as well as an immediate
resource allocation.
Trading dependent resources: In the resource market, buyers usually demand a com-
bination of computer resources as a bundle to perform a task [SMT02]. This
bases on the fact that computer resources (e.g. in the Computational Grid) are
complementarities. Complementarities are resources with superadditive valuations
            , as the sum of the valuations for the single resources is
less than the valuation for the whole bundle.
Suppose, for example, a buyer intending to render images requires hard disk, CPU,
and main memory. If any component of the bundle, say the CPU, is not allocated
to him, the remaining bundle has no value for him since the rendering cannot be
processed without the CPU. In order to avoid the exposure risk (i.e. receiving only
one part of the bundle5 without the other), the mechanism must allow for bids on
bundles. Likewise, the seller can also express bids on bundles.
Support for multi-attribute resources: Resources in the resource market are typically
not completely standardized, as similar resources can differ in their quality. A hard
disk can be characterized by its quality attributes capacity (in Gigabyte (GB)), ac-
cess time (in milliseconds (ms)), and data throughput (in bits per second (bits/s)).
For example, a rendering job requiring a minimum amount of 250 GB can be con-
ducted by a 500 GB hard disk; however, it can not be executed by a 100 GB hard
disk. As such, minimum quality requirements must be met, while similar resources
of superior quality work as well. Hence, minimum quality requirements must be
met, while similar resources of superior quality work as well6.
Language includes co-allocation constraints: Capacity demanding Grid applications
usually require allocating simultaneously several homogenous service instances
from different providers. For instance, a large scaled simulation may require several
computation services to be completed in time. In the Grid literature, the simultane-
ous allocation of multiple homogenous services is often referred to as co-allocation
[AMA04, CFK04]. A mechanism for the Grid has to enable co-allocations and has
to provide functionality to control this: Firstly, it is desirable to limit the maximal
number of co-allocations for services, i.e. to limit the maximum number of divi-
sions of a service. For instance, a buyer wants to execute a specific application that
requires a computation service which can be allocated at most from three different
5A bundle denotes a combination of resources.
6The network congestion can also be included by the use of attributes. Therefore, network congestion
metrics have to be defined and evaluated in future work, e.g. [Wol98], [Loe04]
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sellers. Secondly, it is required to couple multiple services of a bundle, i.e. to guar-
antee that these resources are allocated from the same seller and – as such – will
be executed on the same machine. Suppose a legacy application requires storage
and computation. Due to application restrictions it can only be executed on a single
machine.
No partial execution on the buyers’ side: The mechanism is required to avoid partial
executions of services. Any partial execution of a buyer’s request is useless.
Partial execution on the sellers’ side: A seller of resources (e.g. an owner of a scaled
server farm) is also willing to sell just a part of the offered resources. Thus, the
possibility of a partial executing on the sellers’ side must be given.
4.2 Meeting the Requirements – Related Work
A number of mechanisms have been proposed that attempt to solve the resource allocation
problem in such a resource market or related architectures. Most of these mechanisms are
central in nature in a way that the allocation problem is solved by a central entity using
global optimization algorithms without the employment of prices. This central entity re-
quires detailed information about the demand and supply situation in order to be effective.
As information is dispersed among the buyers and sellers, central allocation algorithms
may not enfold their full power, because this information requirement is not even closely
met. Market-based approaches incorporate incentives for truthful information revelation
by implementing prices.
Surveying the literature, various mechanisms for allocating computer resources can be
found. Most approaches adapt classical auction mechanism or decentralized bargaining
schemas for standardized products as described in section 3.2. Furthermore, there exists
a number of multi-attribute, bundle, or combinatorial mechanisms, which can be used
to trade dependent and non-standardized products. Both types of mechanisms and their
suitability for the resource market will be discussed in the following.
4.2.1 Centralized Mechanisms
The use of market mechanisms for allocating computer resources is not a completely new
phenomenon7. [WHH 92] and [RN98] propose the application of Vickrey auctions for
the allocation of homogenous computational resources in distributed systems. Vickrey
auctions achieve truthful bidding as a dominant strategy and hence result in efficient allo-
cations.
7A detailed overview of classical auctions in resource allocation systems is given among others in
[KBM02].
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[BSGA01] were among the first who motivated the transfer of market-based systems
from distributed systems to Grids. Nonetheless, they propose classical one-sided auc-
tion types, which cannot account for combinatorial bids. [WPBB01b] compare classical
auctions with a bargaining market. As a result, they come to the conclusion that the bar-
gaining market is superior to an auction based market. This result is less surprising, as
the authors only consider classical auction formats, where buyers cannot express bids on
bundles.
[SMT02] account for combinatorial bids by providing a taˆtonnement process for allo-
cation and pricing Grid resources. Furthermore, [NBC 05] propose repeated combinato-
rial auctions as a microeconomic resource allocator in distributed systems. Nonetheless,
the resources are still considered to be standardized commodities. Standardization of the
resources would either imply that the number of resources are limited compared to the
number of all possible resources or that there are many mechanisms, which are likely to
suffer under fewer participation. Both implications result in rather inefficient allocations.
Additionally, state-of-the-art mechanisms widely neglect co-allocation attributes for
bundles and quality constraints for single resources. Hence, the use of these mechanisms
in the Grid environment is considerably diminished.
[WWWMM01] model single-sided auction protocols for the allocation and schedul-
ing of resources under consideration of different time constraints. [Con02] goes one step
further by designing a combinatorial bidding procedure for job scheduling including dif-
ferent running, starting, and ending times of jobs on a processing machine. However,
these approaches are single-sided and favour monopolistic sellers or monopsonistic buy-
ers in a way that they allocate greater portions of the surplus. Installing competition on
both sides is deemed superior, as no particular market side is systematically put at advan-
tage.
Demanding competition on both sides suggests the development of a combinato-
rial exchange. In literature, [PKE01] introduce the first combinatorial exchange as a
single-shot sealed bid auction. As payment scheme, Vickrey discounts are approximated.
[BN04] and [PCE 05] propose an iterative combinatorial exchanges for the allocation
problem. By doing so, the preference elicitation problem can be alleviated, as the bidders
can restrict their attention to some preferred bundles in contrast to all       possible
combinations, where  is the number of different resources. Obviously, these approaches
do not account for quality constraints and are thus not directly applicable for the Grid
allocation problem.
Counteractively, [BDGS05] propose a family of combinatorial auctions for allocating
Grid services. Although, the mechanism accounts for quality and time attributes and
enables the simultaneous trading of multiple buyers and sellers, there is no competition
on the sellers’ side as these orders are aggregated to one virtual order. Moreover, the
mechanism neglects co-allocation constraints.
Table 4.2 summarizes the aforementioned results and reviews the related mechanisms
according to the requirements presented in section 4.1.2. The participants row denotes,
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Auction Participants Direction Combinatorial Quality Co-Allocation
Bids Attributes
[RN98],
     sealed-bid no no no[WHH 92]
[BSGA01]      iterative no no no
[WPBB01b]      iterative no no no
[SMT02]      iterative yes no no
[WWWMM01]      iterative yes no no
[Con02]      iterative yes no no
[NBC 05]         sealed-bid yes no no
[PKE01]     sealed-bid yes no no
[BN04],
    iterative yes no no[PCE 05]
[BDGS05]         sealed-bid yes no yes
Table 4.2: Market Mechanisms for Grid
whether a mechanism is single-sided (   ) or double-sided (   ). Multiple or aggre-
gated instances of single-sided mechanisms are denoted by     . The directions row
indicates if the mechanism is a one-shot (sealed-bid) or a multiple round game (iterative).
The further rows classify the mechanisms concerning their support for combinatorial bids,
quality attributes, and co-allocation restrictions.
As table 4.2 demonstrates, there is no market mechanism that installs competition
on both sides, includes combinatorial bids, allows for time constraints, manages quality
constraints, and considers co-allocation constraints.
Furthermore, there exists a number of approaches applying mechanisms – mostly auc-
tions – to Grid related domains like the energy market or machine scheduling tasks. As
these domains evince differences to the proposed Grid scenario, the related mechanisms
are not appropriable.
Reviewing the requirements for a resource market, it becomes obviously that none of
the presented classical auction types and combinatorial mechanisms is directly applicable
for the central resource market. None of the mechanisms comprise at the same time
simultaneous bids of multiple sellers and buyers, quality and co-allocation constraints,
and combinatorial bids.
This deliverable intends to fill this need by presenting the design of a multi-attribute
combinatorial exchange for allocating and scheduling Grid resources as described in
[SNW04] and [SNVW05a].
CHAPTER 4. SPECIFICATIONS OF THE RESOURCE MARKET 71
4.2.2 Decentralized Mechanisms
The basic concepts for the decentralized mechanism for the resource market are the same
as on the service market. Therefore, the related work in this section concentrates on
bundling. Bundling influences the decentralized mechanism in the search for bundles
and their creation. Bundles group different resource providers together delivering the
demanded resources. It is expected that the communication and computing complexity
will increase using the bundling concept.
Social welfare economic mainly concentrates on the communication complexity of
the negotiation in multi-agent systems. They bring together ideas from the socioeconomic
sciences on one hand, and from computing and AI on the other hand [ASS02] [DWL03].
The EU project Societies of ComputeeS (SOCS, IST-2001-32530) designs simulations of
societies for distributed resource allocation developing negotiation heuristics [Soc]. The
agents (computees) have incomplete knowledge and have to coordinate and cooperate
with other agents to achieve local or global objectives.
Besides the communication complexity, there is also a need for a fast heuristic strat-
egy creating bundles. In economics, similar problems arise in planning and production
control. The system status in a production environment is continuously changing and has
to be adapted very fast for an efficient usage of the machinery. Research on using fuzzy
logic systems enables a dynamic scheduling of machinery in a production plant [Keu99].
In CATNETS, we have standardized basic services, which deliver a certain quality of ser-
vice. Different scheduling strategies for different quality of service can be used to create
resource bundles. If a fast allocation of resources is the objective of a ”gold”-QoS basic
service, a first come first serve strategy should used for bundle creation.
4.2.3 Summary
Summarizing the related work it is obvious, that no existing market mechanisms fits all
requirements defined in section 4.1.2. As such, a multi-attribute combinatorial exchange
is designed and implemented within the CATNETS project. The decentralized market
mechanism uses the concepts presented at the service market enhancing them with the
bundling requirements of the resource market.
4.3 Design of the Resource Market
This section will provide a detailed presentation of the market models on the resource
market. In analogy to the service market in chapter 3, basic design issues like bidding
language and message specification, which are the same on both mechanisms, are defined
in subsection 4.3.1. The centralized market mechanisms are specified in subsection 4.3.2
and section 4.3.3 presents the decentralized market.
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4.3.1 Bidding Language and Message Specification
Allowing participants to submit multi-attribute combinatorial bids requires a formalized
bidding language that meets the above mentioned requirements:8
Let   be a set of   buyers and  be a set of  sellers, where     defines an
arbitrary buyer and    an arbitrary seller. Furthermore, there is a set of  discrete
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context of resource services, a quality attribute can be the  of a storage service with a
possible corresponding characteristic of .
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8The bidding language neglects time restrictions, i.e. attributes concerning the duration, start, and end
time of a job. For a detailed description on how these attributes can be included, the reader is referred to
[SNVW05a, SNVW05b].
9The constant  has to be greater than the total number of seller bids.
CHAPTER 4. SPECIFICATIONS OF THE RESOURCE MARKET 73
For example, the bid
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The orders of the sellers are formalized in a similar way as the buyers’ orders are.
They do, however, not include maximum divisibility and coupling properties. An order
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The bidding language can be mapped to most parts of common agreement specifi-
cations defined by the Grid community, e.g. WS-Agreement [ACD05]. The mapping
from an existing WS-Agreement to the bidding language is also possible. The following
XML encoded document depicts a WS-Agreement encoded offer for the above described
bidding example (4.1):
<wsag:AgreementOffer>
<wsag:Terms>
<wsag:All>
<wsag:ServiceDescriptionTerm wsag:Name="executable"
wsag:ServiceName="ServerService">
<job:executable>/catnets/file</job:executable>
</wsag:ServiceDescriptionTerm>
<wsag:ServiceDescriptionTerm wsag:Name="arguments"
wsag:ServiceName="ServerService">
<job:arguments>/some/argument</job:arguments>
</wsag:ServiceDescriptionTerm>
<wsag:ServiceDescriptionTerm wsag:Name="readFile"
wsag:ServiceName="StorageService">
<job:arguments>/some/file/to/read</job:arguments>
</wsag:ServiceDescriptionTerm>
<wsag:All>
<wsag:ServiceDescriptionTerm wsag:Name="numberOfCPUs"
wsag:ServiceName="ServerService">
<job:numberOfCPUs>32</job:numberOfCPUs>
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</wsag:ServiceDescriptionTerm>
<wsag:ServiceDescriptionTerm wsag:Name="memoryPerCPU"
wsag:ServiceName="ServerService">
<job:realMemorySize>200</job:realMemorySize>
</wsag:ServiceDescriptionTerm>
<wsag:ServiceDescriptionTerm wsag:Name="storageSpace"
wsag:ServiceName="StorageService">
<job:realMemorySize>1000</job:realMemorySize>
</wsag:ServiceDescriptionTerm>
</wsag:All>
<wsag:GuaranteeTerm wsag:Name="Valuation">
<wsag:ServiceScope>
<wsag:ServiceName>ServerService</wsag:ServiceName>
<wsag:ServiceName>StorageService</wsag:ServiceName>
</wsag:ServiceScope>
<wsag:BusinessValueList>
<wsag:CustomBusinessValue>
<catnets:reservation>10</catnets:reservation>
</wsag:CustomBusinessValue>
</wsag:BusinessValueList>
</wsag:GuaranteeTerm>
<wsag:GuaranteeTerm wsag:Name="Coupling">
<wsag:ServiceScope>
<wsag:ServiceName>ServerService</wsag:ServiceName>
<wsag:ServiceName>StorageService</wsag:ServiceName>
</wsag:ServiceScope>
<wsag:QualifyingCondition>
<catnets:coupling>true</catnets:coupling>
</wsag:QualifyingCondition>
</wsag:GuaranteeTerm>
<wsag:GuaranteeTerm wsag:Name="MaxDivisibility">
<wsag:ServiceScope>
<wsag:ServiceName>ServerService</wsag:ServiceName>
</wsag:ServiceScope>
<wsag:QualifyingCondition>
<catnets:maxDivisibility>4</catnets:maxDivisibility>
</wsag:QualifyingCondition>
</wsag:GuaranteeTerm>
</wsag:All>
</wsag:Terms>
</wsag:AgreementOffer>
The document bases on WS-Agreement and JSDL (Job Specification Description Lan-
guage) specifications. The co-allocation constraints (divisibility and splitting) as well as
the valuation and reservation prices were added as domain specific schemas using a sep-
arate XML-schema (cf. section 3.3.1).
In the following, a central and decentral mechanism for coordinating the resource
market are designed on base of this bidding language.
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4.3.2 Centralized Market
As shown in the environmental analysis (cf. section 4.1), services can be characterized as
multi-attribute heterogeneous commodities. In analogy to the service market, an auction
schema is chosen, as auctions can allocate resources efficiently. Complying with the
requirements defined in section 4.1.2, a multi-attribute combinatorial double auction is
designed.
Firstly, the integration of a central market mechanism into existing Grid architectures
is discussed. After that, the schema is introduced by the definition of a winner determina-
tion rule and a pricing schema.
Resource Market
Following the above definitions of the environment and surveying the Grid literature,
the simplified picture in Figure 4.2 can be adapted as a market place for the resource
market [CFK04]. In essence, the market for trading computer resources (e.g. for trading
Grid resources) is spanned around the resource owners as sellers (e.g. IBM or Sun with
their computer centers), the resource consumers as buyers (e.g. scientists at universities,
rendering or the biochemical firms) and some intermediaries (e.g. Condor, Gallop, Legion
etc.). The intermediaries technically provide the resource management infrastructure for
exploiting remote resources.
Application
Information Service
Local
Resource
Manager
Allocator
Application
Application
Application
Resource
Broker
Requests
Meta-Scheduler
WS-Agreement
Local
Resource
Manager
Local
Resource
Manager
Resource Consumer Resource OwnerIntermediaries
Figure 4.2: The market for Computational Grids
According to the resource management architecture proposed by [CFK04] the inter-
mediary layer consists of three basic components:
Resource Broker: The resource broker components are responsible for resource discov-
ery, selection, aggregation, and subsequently for the data and program transporta-
tion [CB02]. By transforming the resources to the consumers’ requirements (which
are specified for instance in WS-Agreement) into a set of jobs that are self-reliantly
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scheduled on the appropriate resources and subsequently managed, the complex-
ity of the resource market is concealed [VB04]. For the market participants, the
resource broker is apparently more of a black box. A resource broker may also
include a matchmaking between multi-attribute offers and request [Vei03].
Resource Information Manager: The resource information manager provides perva-
sive access to information about the current availability and capability of resources
[CFK04].
Allocator: The allocator coordinates the allocation of resources at multiple sites. Obvi-
ously, the allocator and the information service assume the responsibility of (meta-)
scheduling the jobs.
Based upon this view on the intermediary layer, the market mechanism for the re-
source market can be – in analogy to a market mechanism for the Computational Grid
– sketched as follows: The transition from an intermediary layer to a mediated market
mechanism is not too far. In essence, the scheduling performed by the resource broker
can be shifted to the market mechanism. Instead of sending requests to the information
service, the resource broker can translate the user requirements into bids. Those bids ex-
pressing demand and supply situation are subsequently cleared by the market mechanisms
[SNW04].
Figure 4.1 depicts the high level architecture of the resource market for CATNETS.
Basic services can submit sell orders to the order books, e.g. formulated as a WS-
Agreement encoded offer. In the same way, resource services can submit buy orders
to the order books. Instead of having multiple order books as in the service market, one
central order book is used to guarantee the allocation of several homogeneous goods as a
bundle.
After the participants submitted their bids to the auctioneer, the allocation (winner
determination) and the corresponding prices are determined.
Winner Determination
Based upon the formalized bidding language defined in section 4.3.1, the multi-attribute
combinatorial winner determination problem (WDP) with the objective of achieving al-
locative efficiency can be formalized as a linear mixed integer programm as an extension
of the model presented in [SNW04, SNVW05a, GSVW05]:
Let  
 
 

     , 
 
 

  , and 
 
 

     be the decision variables
of the programm. The binary variable  
 
 

 denotes, whether the bundle 

is allocated
to the buyer    
 
 

   or not   
 
 

  . For a seller , the real-valued variable

 
 

 with   
 
 

   indicates the percentage contingent of the bundle 

allocated to the buyer . For example, 
 
 

   denotes that 50 percent of the
qualities of the bundle 

are allocated from seller  to buyer . In the previous example
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including the 1000 GB storage service, a partial allocation of 500 GB from seller   to
buyer  would lead to 
 
 	


  .
Furthermore, the binary variable 
 
 

 is concatenated with 
 
 

 and denotes
whether the seller   allocates to the buyer  
 
 

   or not 
 
 

  .
max
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 
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

 
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The objective function (4.2) maximizes the surplus   which is defined as the dif-
ference between the sum of the buyer’s valuations 	

 
	
 and the sum of the sellers’
reservation prices 


 
	
. Assuming truthful bidders, the objective function reflects the
goal of maximizing the social welfare in the economy. Constraint (4.3) guarantees that
each seller cannot allocate more than the seller possesses.
Constraint (4.4) ensures that for any allocated bundle, all required resources have to
be fulfilled in at least the demanded qualities. Constraint (4.5) ensures that a resource
will be provided by at most 

 
	
 

 different suppliers . The constraints (4.6) and (4.7)
account for the coupling of two resources. Constraint (4.6) ensures that two resources
have to be provided by the same seller, in case they should be coupled. This constraint
alone does not suffice the coupling requirements of resources. It could happen, that a
coupled computation service with  MIPS and a storage service with  GB would
be co-allocated by two sellers in different qualities, e.g. a computation service with 
MIPS and a storage service with  GB from one seller and a computation service with
 MIPS and a storage service with  GB from another one. To exclude those undesir-
able allocations, constraint (4.7) impose the restriction that coupled resources can not be
co-allocated. Simplifying the model, this also includes free-disposal resources. For in-
stance, if the computation service with  MIPS and the storage service with  GB are
allocated from one particular seller as a bundle, another seller cannot allocate a bundle
containing a rendering service and another storage service to the same buyer. However,
the seller may allocate any bundle without a storage and computation service to the buyer,
e.g. the rendering service alone.
Finally, an association of the real valued decision variable 

 
	
 and the binary
variable 

 
	
 have to be modelled and the decision variables of the optimization prob-
lem have to be defined:
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CHAPTER 4. SPECIFICATIONS OF THE RESOURCE MARKET 79
 
 
 

     ,        

  (4.13)
The constraints (4.8) and (4.9) incorporate an if-then-else constraint, i.e. if a seller
 partially allocates a bundle 

to a buyer  (
 
 

  ), the binary variable  
 
 


has to be  (constraint (4.8)); otherwise,  
 
 

 has to be  (constraint (4.9)). Finally,
the constraints (4.10) - (4.13) define the decision variables of the optimization problem.
As there may exist multiple optimal solutions, ties are broken in favour of maximizing
the number of traded bundles and then at random.
Preliminary Complexity Analysis: The winner determination model (WDP) is -
complete. Consider the special case of the WDP with multiple buyers, one seller, no qual-
ity attributes and no coupling and maximal divisibility restrictions. In this case, the prob-
lem is equivalent to the combinatorial allocation problem (CAP) formulated in [RPH98].
The CAP is equivalent to the set-packing problem (SPP) on hypergraphs [RPH98] which
is known to be -complete [Kar72]. As CAP can be reduced to the WDP, the WDP is
also -complete.
Nevertheless, the application of such a complex problem seems to be promising, as
the number of different bundles in the resource market is restricted. Moreover, [SSGL02,
San99a] report that winner determination problems can be solved quite efficient using
modern information technology.
Furthermore, the central market mechanism leads to (approximately) efficient results.
As such, it fulfills the project requirements to serve as an economic benchmark for the
decentralized market.
Example (Winner Determination): Suppose, there are four buyers 
 
 
 
 

 

, three
sellers 

 
 
 

and two services 

  	

 and 
 
  
 with
	   

 
 
 each with single attributes, namely 

 

    and 

 

  .
The buyers and sellers can submit bids on the bundles 

  

, 
 
  
 
, and


  

 
 
. Each buyer and seller submits a set of bids which are shown in table 4.3
and 4.4.
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 




3 


 




2 


 , 
 

 	 


 	
Table 4.3: Bids of the buyers.
The optimal solution of the winner determination problem is an allocation of the
bundles 

and 

to the buyers 
 
, 

, and 

with 

 
 

  , 


 

  , and



 

  . Taking the sellers’ allocations (table 4.5) into account, the maximized value
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Table 4.4: Bids of the sellers.

  of the clearing process can be calculated with    	 	
. The corresponding schedule
for this allocation is given in table 4.5.
    Allocation


 
 



 

  

 


 



 
 

 

 
 
 



 

  

 
Table 4.5: Allocation for the example.
For instance, buyer 


receives the bundle  
 
	 

 

 from seller 

. Although



does not require all the allocated computation capabilities of the allocated resource


, a partial execution of the specific resource 

as bundles can only be partial executed
as a whole. This stems from the economic fact, that complementary resources in a bun-
dle cannot be priced separately and – as such – an isolated resource cannot be executed
partially.
The outcome of this model is allocative efficient, as long as buyers and sellers reveal
their valuations truthfully. The incentive to set bids according to the valuation is induced
by an efficient pricing mechanism that is introduced in the following.
Pricing
The question how to determine payments made by participants to the exchange and vice
versa after the mechanism has determined the winners is referred to as pricing prob-
lem [PKE01]. With respect to the objective of achieving an efficient allocation, a pric-
ing scheme based on a Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) [Vic61, Cla71, Gro73] mecha-
nism would attain this objective. Moreover, Groves mechanisms are the only allocative-
efficient and incentive compatible mechanisms [GL77].
The basic idea of a VCG mechanism is to grant a participant a discount on its bids.
This discount reflects the impact of that bid on the social welfare. A VCG mechanism
is efficient, incentive-compatible, and individual rational for participants with quasi lin-
ear utility functions [PKE01]. However, [MS83] proved that it is impossible to design
an exchange, which is incentive compatible, (interim) individually rational, and budget
balanced that achieves efficiency in equilibrium.
Hence, the VCG pricing scheme is briefly illustrated to serve as a benchmark. Sub-
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Agent   
  

 

  

  
 



 
3.15 1.5 
 
 
 

  


2.87 1.8 
 

 

  


3.8 0.87 
 

 

  


3.3 1.37 
 

 

  

 
2.87 1.8 
 
 
 

  


3.8 0.87 
 

 

  	
Table 4.6: Vickrey discounts and prices
sequently, an adapted -pricing scheme is introduced as an adequate compromise mecha-
nism achieving a fairly efficient allocation that is budget balanced.
Vickrey Pricing Let    be the set of buyers and  be the set of sellers who are part
of the allocation (i.e. 
	
 

   with      and 	
	
 

 
 
 with   ). The
union of both sets is defined as     , where    is an agent who is part of
the allocation.
Let     be the maximized value of the clearing mechanism and   
 

  be the maxi-
mized value of the allocation without the agent . Therefore, the Vickrey discount for an
agent  can be calculated by 
  
  
 
   
 

 .
In consideration of the Vickrey discounts 
  
, the Vickrey price 
 	
 

 for
a bundle 

and a buyer  can be calculated by

 	
 

  
	
 


 	

and the Vickrey price 
 
 

 for a bundle 

and a seller  by

 
 

  

 


 
	
	
	
 

  
 

Applying the VCG pricing schema to the above presented example (     ) re-
sults into the prices 
  
 

 and the discounts 
  
shown in table 4.6.
A Vickrey-Clark-Groves mechanism is efficient and individual rational, however, in
an exchange not budget balanced. Aggregating the net payments of the example leads to a
negative value with   	  . In this case, the auctioneer
has to endow the exchange, which is practical not realizable (cf. section 4.1.2).
Relaxing the efficiency property, a possible implementation of a budget-balanced pric-
ing rule for double auctions is the -pricing scheme10.
10Holding most of the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves properties, another possible pricing schema is the so-called
approximated Vickrey pricing mechanism introduced by [PKE01]. Due to complexity issues, we restrict
ourselves to the  -pricing scheme. An application of the approximated Vickrey pricing mechanism for the
Grid can be found in [SNVW05a]
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K-Pricing The underlying idea of the  -pricing scheme is to determine prices for a
buyer and a seller on the basis of the difference between their bids [SW93]. For instance,
suppose a buyer wants to buy a computation service for 5 and a seller wants to sell a
computation service for at least 4. The difference between these bids is     , i.e.   is
the surplus of this transaction and can be distributed among the participants.
For a single commodity exchange, the -pricing scheme can be formalized as follows:
Let 
 


    be the valuation of a buyer  and 



    be the reservation price of
the buyer’s counterpart 	. It is assumed that    , i.e. the buyer has a valuation for
the commodity which is at least as high as the seller’s reservation price. The price for a
buyer  and a seller 	 can be calculated as 


        with     .
In consideration of the above mentioned bids for the computation service 
 
, the price
results in 

 
              when using    .
As in the service market, a balanced order book is assumed, i.e. the number of buyers
equals the number of sellers. Therefore,  is set to     as it privileges neither the
buyers’ side nor the sellers’ side [Fri91].
The -pricing schema can be adapted for a multi-attribute combinatorial exchange: If
a bundle 

is allocated from one or more sellers, the surplus generated by this allocation
is distributed among a buyer and the sellers. Suppose a buyer  receives a computation
service 
 
  
 
 with 1000 MIPS in time-slot  and values this slot with 
 

 
   .
The buyer obtains the computation service 
 
  
 
 by a co-allocation from seller 	
 
(400 MIPS) with a reservation price of 

 

 
    and from seller 	
 
(600 MIPS) with


 


   	. The distributable surplus of this this allocation is  
 


    	   	.
Buyer  gets    
 


 of this surplus, i.e. the price buyer  has to pay for this slot
is 

 


   

   
 


. Furthermore, the sellers have to divide the other part of
this surplus, i.e.   
 


. This will be done under consideration of each proportion
a seller’s bid has on the surplus. In the example, this proportion 
 


 for seller 	

is 


 


  


and for seller 	
 


 
 


  
 

. The price for a seller 	 gets is
consequently calculated as


 


   

    
 





 



Extending this scheme to all sellers results in the following formalization: Let  
 



be the surplus for a bundle 

of a buyer  with all corresponding sellers leads to:
 
 


   
 



 



 
 

 






 (4.14)
The price for a buyer  is subsequently calculated as


 


   
 



 


  
 


 (4.15)
This means that the difference between the valuation 
 


 of the bundle 

and the
-th proportion of the sum over all corresponding surpluses is determined.
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The price of a seller   is calculated in a similar way: First of all, the proportion

 
 

 of a seller   allocating a bundle 

to the  is given by

 
 

 

 
 


 
 


 
  

 
 


 
 


 (4.16)
Having computed 

 

 and 
 
 

, the price a seller receives for a bundle 

is calcu-
lated as:
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Applying this pricing scheme to the above presented example results in the prices
in table 4.7. In this case, the exchange does not have to subsidize the participants as it
fulfills the budget balance property in a way that no payments towards the mechanism
are necessary. As such, the application of the 
-pricing schema to the resource market is
deemed promising. In [SNVW05b] it is shown, that the 
  pricing schema may lead to
approximate efficient solutions.
  

 

 	

 

  

 

 	

 



 
3 2.25  

0.62 1.31


3 2.1  
 
1.2 2.1


2 1.31  
 
1.5 2.25
Table 4.7: Prices using 
-Pricing with 
  .
Continuous and Periodic Trading In analogy to the central service market specified
in section 3.3.2, a key consideration is the timing of the clearing process. Again, the
mechanism can be cleared continuously or periodically. As both clearing concepts can be
easily implemented into a software system, the final decision concerning the clearing of
the market will be made during the simulation runs11.
Implementation
The presented clearing mechanism as well as the different pricing approximations are
implemented as a Java based prototype [SNVW05a]. CPLEX 9.112 is used as an opti-
mization engine for solving the linear mixed integer program. As a consequence, exact
and optimal solutions are obtained.
Figure 4.5 depicts briefly the sequence of an auction for the CATNETS scenario. Par-
ticipants submit their bids in form of a WS-Agreement offer to the market. After that,
11This can be simple achieved by a configuration setting.
12CPLEX http://www.ilog.com/ is commercial product and is currently the state of the art opti-
mization engine. (Accessed: 22.08.2005)
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Figure 4.4: Sequence of an auction for the resource market.
the WS-Agreement bids are transformed to an internal representation form. Then, the
winner determination component computes the allocation. Finally, prices are computed
in consideration of the allocation. As a result of the market mechanism, the participants
get informed by means of a WS-Agreement whether they are part of the allocation or not.
Figure 4.5 sketches briefly the implemented main components of the market mecha-
nism. The central component is the Market class which instantiates an Environment
(storing participants, goods, and bundles), an Orderbook (storing bids), and a
Mechanism (implementing the winner determination and pricing mechanism). The
Environment and the Orderbook can be filled by XML based documents or dis-
tributions. The Mechanism encapsulates the market mechanism by instantiating an
Outcome class and a Pricing class. The Outcome class is responsible for the win-
ner determination problem and uses a specific solver (e.g. CPLEXAdapater ). The
Pricing class instantiates a pricing mechanism (e.g. VCGPricing) that determines
the net payments.
4.3.3 Decentralized Market
The heuristic strategy in the decentralized market is similar to the service market. We will
describe only the differences to the concept on the service market. The differences arise
with the multi-attributive good and the co-allocation on the resource market compared to
the service market.
The resource market defines a multi-attributive good, but there is only one single
attribute (price) negotiable. Therefore, we can reduce the complexity of the negotiation
to a single attributive bilateral negotiation like on the service market.
The handling of bundling and co-allocation is done before the negotiation starts. As
on the service market, a buyer has his own local order book, where he collects possible
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Figure 4.5: Implemented components of the resource allocation mechanism.
bids and ranks them according to his price (see figure 4.6).
However, he cannot rank them using only the price attribute, because the goods are
multi-attribute. This means, he has to compute the utility of every item in his order book
and rank the incoming offers using a utility function. Before we will describe the utility
function, we describe the request strategy of the buyer (basic service).
The buyer needs a specific resource bundle and has a budget for this bundle. He
broadcasts his query on the network and collects the offers. A buyer interprets the request
received and generates an offer of the whole requested resource bundle or parts of the
bundle, if the bundle is allowed to split. The buyer receives lots of offers for his request,
either offering the complete resource bundle or parts of this bundle. The problem is, that
he has to rank these offers distinguishing in amount and price. This is done using his
utility function. An example for this process shows figure 4.7.
In CATNETS, we will use at the beginning a simple utility function which computes
the price per basic bundle unit. This basic bundle unit is predefined on the CATNETS
resource market. At the end of this step we have a list of possible sellers ranked with
the expected utility of the buyer. The next step is to define one bundle out of the offered
bundles which fulfills the buyer’s request. An optimal solution of this process is known
as a very time-consuming operation. Therefore, we will use the heuristic based on fuzzy
logic and priority scheduling strategies which are mentioned at the related work section
of this chapter. At this stage of the project, we have not finally decided on the scheduling
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strategies because we decide this issue after analyzing first results on bundling from the
simulator.
An example with a first-come-first-serve strategy:
We start with the bundle with the highest expected utility and fill up the bundle with
fitting, high-utility resource bundles until we have the requested bundle size. If there is
no bundle which fits the remaining resource bundle size, we can choose a bundle which
has bigger size to prevent a deadlock of the algorithm. We cut the bundle down to the
requested bundle size, because the buyer would only pay for the requested resource bundle
size. Afterwards we can start the negotiation of the part-bundles.
Negotiation protocol
The basic service breaks up and translates complex requests to resource layer and the
resource co-allocator and starts the negotiation with several local resource managers. The
local resource manager analyzes the request and creates an offer. This process iterates
until an agreement (accept) or reject is reached. If an accept is reached, the resource
allocator confirms and informs the basic service about the contracted resources. The
basic service continues the negotiation with the complex service, using the information
from contracting the resources. The negotiation on the resource layer is processed only
once. It is impossible to renegotiate a resource contract. The resuming negotiation with
the complex service uses the same negotiation protocol and after an accept the payment
process is initiated which pays the basic service and the resource. A reject on the service
market will lead to a reject on the resource market.
The negotiation protocol on the resource market is similar as on the service market.
The message types are the same, only the bidding language has changed. We will present
here the integration of the two markets with the negotiation protocol. Figure 4.8 shows
the protocol for both markets, the service and the resource market.
At the beginning of the negotiation, the basic service generates the first proposal to
the complex service without complete knowledge of the current market price. However,
he estimates the market price using historic information about former negotiations. The
basic service does not enter a phase of resource negotiation, because it would be too much
overhead for all basic services contracting resources not knowing if the complex service
will select this basic service for negotiation.
Once the complex service receives the estimated prices of basic services, he selects
one basic service for negotiation. Before the negotiation continues on the service market,
the basic service will buy the resources on the resource market. If he succeeds and gets
the requested resources, the negotiation on the service market is continued. The protocol
does not allow to re-negotiate resources for performance reasons. If the negotiation on the
service market fails, also the contract on the resource market will not be confirmed any
more. If the negotiation comes to a successful end, the reserved resources are confirmed.
A final confirm messages signals the complex service, that he can now be deployed.
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The transformation of the demand on the service market to a request on the resource
market regarding quality of service and budget is also an important issue in the connec-
tion of the two markets. As we already described in section 3, we designed standardized
services on the service market. One service type (e.g. a ”gold” PDF converter) represents
a discrete quality of service level. This QoS is modeled using templates of the service
market. In the CATNETS project we use one template which represents the bidding lan-
guage on the resource market. Possible implementations can use XML (WS-Agreement)
or binary Java objects for representation. We assume here, that the complex services as
requestors of basic services know the needed basic service type, that represent their QoS
requirements, in advance. A complex service can only request a discrete, pre-defined QoS
level. This is introduced to keep the complexity on the service market low.
4.4 Relations to other Work Packages
In this chapter, centralized and decentralized resource allocation mechanisms for Grid
and ALN markets have been introduced. Both, centralized and decentralized mechanisms
influence the implementation of the simulator and the middleware13 (work package 2 and
3). Their outcomes must also be measurable by the metrics developed in work package 4.
The prototype is affected only by the decentralized mechanisms. In the following sections
some insights are given how these influences will affect future work in the next months.
4.4.1 Relation to Simulator (WP2)
The simulator needs to take inputs from both, centralized and decentralized market mech-
anisms. Therefore, all bidding and bargaining languages that are developed throughout
this chapter have to be included to simulate the resource allocation mechanisms.
Allocation and pricing schemes will be integrated in close cooperation with WP2 in
the next period of the project. Especially, the mapping of the environmental definition, the
interfaces for the communication between the participants and the transfer of the resource
market to the Grid nodes in the simulator are of high relevance.
4.4.2 Relation to Proof of Concept (WP3)
Within the proof of concept work package the prototype and the catallactic middleware are
developed. Only the decentralized market mechanism is implemented in the catallactic
middleware, because the effort of implementing both would be too high.
The key issue is that the bidding languages and the mechanisms are implementable in
13Note, that the centralized mechanism will only be evaluated by the simulator.
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the middleware and the prototype. Beyond this, the interfaces of communication must be
maintained. It would be ideal to have homogeneous definitions, communication language
and interfaces with the simulator work package in order to combine the implementations.
4.4.3 Relation to Evaluation (WP4)
The primary idea of the evaluation work package concerning the mechanisms for the
resource market is to measure the economic and technical efficiency of the proposed re-
source allocation mechanisms (using the measures also described in Section 3.4). Since
the goal of the CATNETS project is to compare the efficiency of those, the measures
developed in WP4 must be applicable to the developed mechanisms.
From the theoretical perspective this means, that the outcomes must be measurable
wrt their economic factors they produce. From the practical point of view the following
issues are of high relevance:
  Which data will be produced by the mechanisms during simulation.
  Which data are stored and evaluated after simulations.
  Are the proposed metrics in WP4 capable of investigating these datasets.
  How can the proposed metrics be implemented to test the different efficiency criteria.
Since the results of these measurements will be considered the main outcome of the
project, they must derive special attention by all project partners. They have to be care-
fully developed and adapted to the Grid/ALN market requirements formulated in this
chapter.
Chapter 5
Mappable Applications
This section compares the CATNETS market model, and the component modules identi-
fied so far, to existing applications with a great number of connected peers. All of these
applications exhibit the unfavorable properties presented in the previous sections and re-
quire efficient coordination mechanisms. By introducing the CATNETS market model,
we aim to ameliorating the performance. Considering possible application domains, the
following 3 systems have been identified: BITTORRENT, PLANETLAB and CORAL.
They will be presented shortly and an analysis is given on the possible matching of Catal-
laxy to those applications. This matching will be done on the application layer. Lower
Network layers are not explicitly mentioned.
The criteria for selection of these applications has been the following: for all poten-
tial applications, we have selected applications which are exemplary for their application
area, have a certain degree of popularity, and the source code is available for inspection,
modification and experimentation. Ideally, the candidate applications should have been
evaluated and characterized in public papers, thus we could then compare our results with
an external baseline evaluation.
5.1 BitTorrent
In the context of Peer-to-Peer networks, we have selected a P2P protocol which has a
clearly specified protocol, that is popular enough, and that is used for clearly useful and
legal purposes (some other P2P networks are almost only used for sharing copyrighted
content). This protocol is BitTorrent 1[Coh03].
With BitTorrent, when multiple people are downloading the same file at the same
time, they are also uploading pieces of the file to each other. This redistributes the cost of
upload to downloaders, thus making hosting a file with a potentially unlimited number of
1http://bittorrent.com
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downloaders affordable. Following [IUKB 04], a torrent consists of a central component,
called tracker and all the currently active peers. BitTorrent distinguishes between two
kinds of peers depending on their download status: clients that have already a complete
copy of the file and continue to serve other peers are called seeds; clients that are still
downloading the file are called leechers. The tracker is the only centralized component
of the system. The tracker is not involved in the actual distribution of the file; instead, it
keeps meta-information about the peers that are currently active and acts as a rendezvous
point for all the clients of the torrent.
A user joins an existing torrent by downloading a torrent file (usually from a Web
server), which contains the IP address of the tracker. Generic or specialized web search
engines usually lead to pages where a file can be downloaded from one or several trackers.
The user has to select one torrent file (and thus the tracker) to start downloading the file
which will let him connect to the tracker and an initial seed with a complete copy of
the file. In case of multiple trackers available for the same object, statistics about every
tracker are published to help the visitor choose the right tracker. To update the tracker’s
global view of the system, active clients periodically (every 30 minutes) report their state
to the tracker or when joining or leaving the torrent. Upon joining the torrent, a new client
receives from the tracker a list of active peers to connect to.
Typically, the tracker provides 50 peers chosen at random among active peers while
the client seeks to maintain connections to 20-40 peers. If ever a client fails to maintain
at least 20 connections, it reconnects the tracker to obtain additional peers. The set of
peers to which a client is connected is called its peer set. The clients involved in a torrent
cooperate to replicate the file among each other using swarming techniques: the file is
broken into equal size chunks (typically 256kB each) and the clients in a peer set exchange
chunks with one another. The swarming technique allows the implementation of parallel
download where different chunks are simultaneously downloaded from different clients.
Each time a client obtains a new chunk, it informs all the peers it is connected with.
Interactions between clients are primarily guided by two principles. First, a peer pref-
erentially sends data to peers that reciprocally sent data to him. This ”tit-for-tat” strategy
is used to encourage cooperation and ban ”free-riding”. Second, a peer limits the num-
ber of peers being served simultaneously to 4 peers and continuously looks for the 4 best
downloaders (in terms of the rate achieved) if it is a seed or the 4 best uploaders if it is a
leecher. In terms of the CATNETS model, people interested in downloading a file, run-
ning a web browser and a BitTorrent client has the role of Client. They look for a torrent
file (a tracker) on a search engine and looking at the statistics of several trackers offering
the same file they manually select one tracker (on the Service market and the tracker has
the role of Basic Service). The tracker joins the client in a swarm of peers exchanging
fragments of the file of common interest. All BitTorrent clients in the swarm belong to
the Resource market and are acting as Resources.
In terms of the CATNETS model, people interested in downloading a file, running a
web browser and a BitTorrent client has the role of a Complex Service. They look for a
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torrent file (a tracker) on several online web catalogues and look at the statistics of several
trackers offering the same file. They manually select one tracker (on the service market).
The tracker adds the requesting complex service to a swarm of peers (resource services)
exchanging fragments of the file of common interest. All BitTorrent clients in the swarm
belong to the resource market and are acting as resource services.
5.2 PlanetLab
In the context of ALN for distributed computing using computing resources across admin-
istrative boundaries (Grid computing), we have identified two unique initiatives offering
an open infrastructure for the deployment of services and the use of computational re-
sources in the academic or industrial environment. Both are unique in terms of size,
availability and relative maturity. They are PlanetLab [CCR 03] [BBC 04a] and Globus
2.
PlanetLab is a geographically distributed overlay network designed to support the
deployment and evaluation of planetary-scale network services. Two high-level goals
shape its design. First, to enable a large research community to share the infrastructure,
PlanetLab provides distributed virtualization, whereby each service runs in an isolated
slice of PlanetLab’s global resources. Second, to support competition among multiple
network services, PlanetLab decouples the operating system running on each node from
the network-wide services that define PlanetLab, a principle referred to as unbundled
management.
Figure 5.1: PlanetLab map of member organizations (as of 9/2005)
PlanetLab currently includes over 500 machines spanning 250 sites (i.e. organiza-
tions) and more than 20 countries 5.1. It supports more than 500 research projects which
2http://www.globus.org
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focus on a wide range of services, including file sharing and network embedded storage,
content distribution networks, routing and multi-cast overlays, QoS overlays, scalable ob-
ject location services, anomaly detection mechanisms, and network measurement tools.
The PlanetLab middleware and API is open and extensible. Distributed applications can
use the services offered by the virtualized operating system in each node (currently the
Linux API) plus the XML-RPC interface offered by the PlanetLab Central (PLC) admin-
istration.
The service-resource cycle in PlanetLab is as follows:
• In every node, the node manager is in charge of creating and allocating resources to
vservers (virtual machines), and the resource monitor is in charge of tracking node’s
availability of resources and informing the central agent about available resources.”
• The agent tracks nodes’ free resources, which are advertised to resource brokers
and offered as tickets to services interested in acquiring and using resources. This
agent is part of Planet-Lab Central (PLC), a centrally-controlled brokerage service
that can be decentralized using a delegation mechanism.
• In every service, the resource broker obtains tickets from agents on behalf of service
managers, which are in charge of redeeming tickets with node managers to acquire
resources, and if resources can be acquired, start the service in that node.
In terms of the CATNETS model, processes interested in using a given service have
the role of complex services. They look for and select basic services. All node managers
and resource monitors act as resources and all resource brokers and service managers act
as basic services on the resource market. Both are mediated by the central PlanetLab
agent.
The Globus toolkit is the reference implementation of the standard Grid protocols and
APIs that the Global Grid Forum (GGF) is defining for different aspects of distributed
computing, such as security, resource management, data management, and information
discovery. The Globus middleware has been adopted by most of the Grid projects world-
wide. In comparison with the Globus Grid implementation which offers a higher level
homogeneous API, PlanetLab offers a less coupled and simpler API based on the idea of
virtualization. While the grid offers an ample collection of middleware services unified in
a single architecture as exemplified by the Globus, PlanetLab offers an API for the basic
service for creating slices, and associating people and nodes to them. Slices appear to
users as a set of virtual Linux machines (i.e. offering a multiple Linux API instead of
a higher level and abstract API: virtualization in contrast to abstraction). Additionally,
there may be competing services providing additional functionality that also run using the
PlanetLab infrastructure (multiplicity in contrast to homogeneity). There is another dif-
ference to emphasize: While the grid is primarily interesting in gluing together a modest
number of high-performance computing resources connected by high performance net-
works, PlanetLab is focused on scaling less bandwidth and CPU intensive applications
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offering innovative services across a wider collection of nodes [PACR02]. Finally, both
worlds can be combined: There are pilot experiments where Globus based applications
are run on top of PlanetLab (in a slice, on several nodes or slivers).
5.3 Coral
In the context of content distribution, the selection criteria applies to two academic content
distribution networks (CDNs) which by coincidence both run on the PlanetLab infrastruc-
ture: Coral [FFM04] and CoDeeN [PWP 03]. CoDeeN is a proxy based CDN with some
restrictions and limitations, and in contrast Coral provides the typical service that a CDN
does with some very interesting properties, and focusing on redirecting clients requests
to the ”best” copy in terms of load, locality, proximity, offloading work from web origin
servers. Coral CDN is a decentralized, self-organizing, Peer-to-Peer web-content distribu-
tion network 5.2. Coral CDN leverages the aggregate bandwidth of volunteers (typically
PlanetLab slivers) running the software to absorb and dissipate most of the traffic of web
sites using the system. In doing so, Coral CDN replicates content in proportion to the con-
tent’s popularity, regardless of the publisher’s resources, in effect democratizing content
publication [FFM04].
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Figure 5.2: Coral’s deployment and clusters based on network round-trip-time (letter
identifies cluster)
To use Coral CDN, a content publisher - or someone posting a link to a high-traffic
portal - simply appends ”.nyud.net:8090” to the host name in a URL. Through DNS redi-
rection, oblivious clients with unmodified web browsers are transparently redirected to
nearby Coral web caches. These caches cooperate to transfer data from nearby peers
whenever possible, minimizing both the load on the origin web server and the end-to-
end latency experienced by browsers. This requires two mechanisms: finding a close
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peer and identifying a close copy of the requested object. The first is achieved by map-
ping Coral servers and clients into clusters based on latency. The second is done using
a locality-aware request routing algorithm or indexing abstraction (also know as a Dis-
tributed Sloppy Hash Table or DSHT). Every Coral peer is running three elements: a
DNS server, a HTTP proxy and a DSHT element.
The Coral CDN is implemented on top of a very simple middleware based on RPC
over UDP, structured in terms of events and callbacks, with a module for clustering nodes,
mapping client locations, routing requests by proximity (Coral DSHT), and modified DNS
and HTTP proxy servers.
In terms of the CATNETS model, applications interested in a file use a Coral plug-in
to ”coralize” URLs. These applications have the role of a complex service. They request
a coralized URL, thus going to a Coral DNS server where a response, the IP address of a
close-by Coral proxy will be selected among many of them, based on the location of the
complex service. This is the service market, the Coral http proxy has the role of a basic
service. The complex service Coral plug-in will contact the http proxy with the given IP
address. Then the proxy will look for the requested file in its own storage or will look for
a close copy of the file in other peers using the Coral DSHT routing algorithm. Proxies
belong to the Resource market, the election in the market is determined by the DSHT
algorithm looking for a close copy of a file, and proxies are acting as resources.
Chapter 6
Conclusion
The key issue of this work package is the structured and theoretical identification and
definition of market mechanisms for Application Layer Networks. The results of this
deliverable provide the theoretical basis for the simulator work package (WP2), the proof-
of-concept work package (WP3), and the evaluation work package (WP4).
Hence, we provide a summary on the results of this report in Section 6.1 and an
outlook on the next steps to be taken in Section 6.2.
6.1 Review of this Work
This work comprises several parts. Firstly, a market based perspective for Application
Layer Networks is drawn. Here, two markets are distinguished: a service and a resource
market. The service market is used by customer agents that aim on purchasing a certain
service in order to fulfil a task. The second market – the resource market – is the market
on which the service instances trade the resources they need in order to operate the offered
services (compare Chapter 1).
The approach which is chosen in both cases in order to design the market characteris-
tics is the so-called Market Engineering approach (compare Chapter 2). This approach is
based on a process including several steps to define markets in a structured way. The pro-
cess is accompanied by a set of well chosen methods that are consequently applied in the
definition phase of the market mechanisms for ALNs in the CATNETS project. Next to
defining and implementing as well as testing market mechanisms, this approach also em-
ploys means of experimental analysis and computerized simulation for the evaluation of
market mechanisms. An important source is the work done in the domain of mechanism
design and economic engineering in past years.
In the following, the Market Engineering approach is employed for the service and
the resource market (compare Chapter 3 and Chapter 4). As a result of the analysis of
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the requirements for the service market, centralized and decentralized mechanisms are
sketched.
6.2 Outlook on Next Steps
The next steps within the CATNETS project comprise the implementation of the central
and decentral mechanisms into the simulator platform (WP2). Furthermore, the bilateral
bargaining strategies (decentral) will be used in the proof-of-concept prototype (WP3) in
order to evaluate the application of the Catallaxy concept in Application Layer Networks.
Finally, the central and decentral mechanisms will be evaluated by means of the work
done in work package 4.
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ISSN
This paper identifies and defines suitable market 
mechanisms for Application Layer Networks 
(ALNs). On basis of the structured Market 
Engineering process, the work comprises the 
identification of requirements which adequate 
market mechanisms for ALNs have to fulfill. 
Subsequently, two mechanisms for each, the 
centralized and the decentralized case are 
described in this document
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